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In the first essay, I examine the burden of cross-listing prices to adjust to changes in 
exchange rates. Using a 3-system vector moving average model, I measure the effects of 
exchange rate shocks on cross-listing stock prices in the home and U.S. markets. My 
sample consists of 46 cross-listings on the NYSE from Canada, Brazil, and Mexico. 
Findings indicate that New York prices bear roughly 60% of the adjustment to exchange 
rates for Canadian and Mexican securities, and roughly 45% for Brazilian securities. The 
NYSE burden of adjustment varies considerably across firms, ranging from 7% to 100% 
for Canada, 10% to 79% for Brazil, and 24% to 90% for Mexico. Tests show that the 
NYSE burden to adjust to exchange rate changes is highest for big firms, and for those 
with relatively high NYSE trading costs or low NYSE trading volume. For the majority 
of firms, tests also show that the combined markets burdens to adjust to exchange rates 
increase during the period of heightened exchange rate volatility. My results have 
important implications for international price discovery tests, especially for those that fail 
to model an independent role for exchange rates at the firm level. 
 In the second essay, I examine the dynamics of price discovery for markets with 
varying market characteristics. I estimate Hasbrouck’s (1995) information share over two 
distinct time periods of 2008 for my sample of 23 Canadian firms, 13 Brazilian firms, and 
10 Mexican firms. In contrast to most prior research, I find that the home market does not 





discovery leader. Findings show that the price discovery on the NYSE is higher for cross-
listings with greater NYSE market depth, lower burden to adjust to exchange rates on the 
NYSE, with greater trading volume and lower cost, and for smaller, low market-to-book 
firms. Findings show that market depth and the burden of prices to adjust to exchange 
rate shocks are key determinants for price discovery that rival the importance of trading 
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LOST IN TRANSLATION: 
WHICH STOCKS BEAR THE BURDEN TO ADJUST TO EXCHANGE RATES? 
 
 
The efficient markets hypothesis assumes that security market prices rapidly reflect new 
information, making it very difficult to “beat the market.” However, the efficient markets 
hypothesis is agnostic regarding precisely where new information is first reflected for 
securities that trade in more than one marketplace, i.e. where price discovery occurs. 
Recent research attempts to locate where price discovery occurs for stocks that cross-list 
internationally, but often ignores the informational role of exchange rates in the price 
formation process.
1
 In related work, Grammig et al. (2005) offer simulations showing 
that the failure to properly model exchange rates leads to biased price discovery 
estimates, especially during periods of high exchange rate volatility.  
 The goal of my study is to measure the effect of exchange rate shocks on stock 
prices for cross-listings from distinct markets over volatile currency time periods. My 
study is designed to provide robust tests of the independent informational role of 
exchange rates in the price discovery process. Specifically, I assess the impact of 
exchange rate shocks on U.S. and home market prices for 46 cross-listings on the NYSE 
from Canada, Brazil, and Mexico during 2008, one of the most volatile periods for stocks 
                                                 
1
 Most firms cross-list in the U.S. via ADRs, which originate from many countries. In contrast, direct cross-
listings (not via ADRs) are mostly limited to Canadian and Israeli stocks. To list as an ordinary share, firms 
must register with the SEC, comply with SEC regulations, and provide financial statements that comply 
with US GAAP. Further discussion of direct cross-listing requirements can be found in Karolyi (1998). See 






and currencies in recent history. The three home markets are characterized with different 
degrees of financial development, investor protection, insider trading law enforcement, 
liquidity, cost, and trading volume. Also, the markets provide the largest number of 
cross-listings, and the three markets span the continuum from developed market (Canada) 
to emerging market (Mexico). While the three markets share significant intraday trading 
overlap, the geographic proximities of each market to New York differ substantially. All 
three markets are major economic trade partners with the U.S. For instance, as of 2010, 
U.S. is the top economic trade partner with Canada and Mexico and is the second biggest 
trade partner with Brazil, all of which suggests that the markets might share in the burden 
to adjust to exchange rates more equally versus the three German stocks studied by 
Grammig et al. (2005).  
 Most cross-listing price discovery papers examine relations between home prices 
and foreign prices, after converting prices to a common currency. Each cross-listing into 
the U.S. signifies ownership in the underlying security originating from the foreign 
market. In the absence of arbitrage restrictions, the law of one price suggests that the two 
securities be priced identically, at all points in time, after adjusting for exchange rates. 
However, exchange rate shocks might exert an independent effect on stock prices, and 
the effect may be asymmetric for the home and foreign markets. For example, 
depreciation of the Mexican peso versus the U.S. dollar (alternatively, appreciation of the 
dollar versus the peso) likely will lead to an increase in the peso price of the security on 
the BOLSA and a decrease in the dollar price on the NYSE. But, no evidence exists to 
suggest that the two prices will automatically meet in the middle. Nor is there evidence 





implicitly made by most cross-listing studies when converting prices to a common 
currency. 
 Grammig et al. (2005) show that the choice of currency conversion matters. Their 
simulation shows that price discovery inferences depend on whether the home currency is 
converted to the foreign currency or if the foreign currency is converted to the home 
currency, and that the errors in inference increase with the volatility of exchange rates. 
The authors also examine three German stocks that cross-listed between the Frankfurt 
and New York Stock Exchange during the three month period August 1999 – October 
1999. Relying on tests that endogenize the exchange rate, their findings show that most of 
the exchange rate burden was borne by the NYSE. The authors conclude that the foreign 
investor “is subject to exchange rate risk in that prices incorporate another source of 
uncertainty beyond the value of the firm itself, and this is not the case for the home-
market investor.”  
 The Grammig et al. (2005) paper makes important contributions, but is limited 
with respect to the number of stocks, concentration of stocks in a dominant home market, 
short overlapping intraday trading interval, and examination of relatively stable dollar to 
euro exchange rates. Whether exchange rate uncertainty truly imposes a burden on 
foreign investors and whether this relationship holds outside the Germany-U.S. country 
3-stock pairing is unknown. In contrast, my tests are conducted on a sample characterized 
by a greater mix of “international” and domestic firms versus the three blue chip German 
stock sample studied by Grammig et al. (2005), and span a period of significant stock 





 To estimate the burden borne by each stock to adjust to exchange rate shocks, I 
develop a 3-system vector moving average model that produces impulse response 
coefficients related to exchange rate shocks. I create a translation risk measure equal to 
the percentage of the exchange rate – stock price adjustment borne by the NYSE relative 
to the combined adjustments of the NYSE and home markets. A high (low) percentage 
indicates that the NYSE (home) bears most of the burden to adjust to exchange rate 
shocks.  
 My tests show that New York prices bear roughly 60% of the adjustment to 
exchange rates for Canadian and Mexican securities, and roughly 45% for Brazilian 
securities. Results differ markedly across firms and across time, and show that the 
combined markets’ burdens to adjust to exchange rates increase during the period of high 
exchange rate volatility. Therefore, the burden of prices to adjust to exchange rate shocks 
is not homogeneous within country, and is sensitive to exchange rate volatility. I find that 
the burden on New York prices to adjust to exchange rates is higher for larger firms and 
for firms with lower trading volume and higher bid-ask spreads on the NYSE versus the 
home market. These findings indicate that the burden of prices to adjust to exchange rates 
is expected to shift more to emerging markets as the migration of cross-listing trading 
volume to the NYSE increases.   
 My study has important implications for price discovery tests that ignore the 
informational role that exchange rates have on stock prices. Tests that fail to model the 
independent effect of exchange rates produce misleading price discovery results. In 
particular, these tests measure the combined effect on prices of fundamental news about 





 In my tests, I am able to disentangle the effects on stock prices of firm-specific 
fundamental news and exchange rate news. Also, I am able to show the extent to which 
each stock’s price discovery is affected by the exchange rate burden. My findings show 
that the exchange rate burden is not a broad market-based effect, but instead is a stock-
specific effect. Therefore, any attempts to model the effect of exchange rates with 
market-wide adjustments are wrong.   
 The plan of the paper is as follows. The methodology is explained in Section 1. 
The data are detailed in Section 2. Testable propositions are presented in Section 3. 
Results are discussed in Section 4, and concluding remarks are offered in Section 5.  
1.1.  Methodology 
For any cross-listing, log prices are assumed to evolve by the following processes: 
, ,HOME t t HOME tP P                                (1.1) 
 , ,NYSE t t NYSE tP P     (1.2) 
 1 ,  t t P tP P     (1.3) 
 / , / , 1 ,H US t H US t E tE E     (1.4) 
Pt is the equilibrium (log) price stated in the home currency, and EH/US is the log-
transformed home price of one US dollar. By assumption, the innovations 
, , ,, , ,HOME t NYSE t P t    and ,E t  are serially and contemporaneously uncorrelated with zero 
mean.     
 Ignoring microstructure issues such as trading frictions and costs for the moment, 
the home price must equal the currency converted NYSE price, using the law of one price 





rate equals the NYSE price converted to the home currency. The natural log of the 
product of the prices equals the sum of the natural logs: , / ,NYSE t H US tP E . Thus, in order 
for the law of one price to hold in the 3-system model, , , / , .HOME t NYSE t H US tP P E 
2
 With 
this set-up, the 3-system error correction model can be expressed as:  
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 The equations indicate that prices respond to the prior period’s deviation from the long-
run equilibrium (the error correction term), and to lagged changes in prices and exchange 
rates.   






t t i t i t
i
p c p p   

        (1.8) 
                                                 
2
 Stated differently, the log home price minus the sum of the log NYSE price and the log exchange rate 
equals 
, , / ,( ),HOME t NYSE t H US tE   where , , / ,HOME t NYSE t H US tE   is the exchange rate adjusted log pricing 
error on the NYSE. Therefore, the linear combination of the log price on the home market, the log price on 
the NYSE, and the log exchange rate equals the difference in the currency-adjusted pricing errors
, , / ,( ).HOME t NYSE t H US tE   This result implies that the linear combination of the log prices and exchange 
rate is stationary, and that the log home price, log NYSE price, and log exchange rate are cointegrated with 
cointegrating vector (1, 1, 1);    e.g, (1, -1, -1)×(PHOME, PNYSE, EH/US)′ = PHOME – (PNYSE + EH/US) = 





where, ∆pt is the 3 × 1 vector of changes in prices (∆PHOME,t , ∆PHOME,t, ∆EH/US,t )′, c is 3 × 
1 vector of constants, α is the 3 × 1 vector of adjustment parameters, β′ is the 1 × 3 
cointegrating vector, pt-1 is a 3 × 1 vector of prices for period t-1, i are 3 × 3 matrices of 
autoregressive coefficients for lag i = 1, 2, …, N, and εt is the 3 × 1 vector of error terms. 
If the law of one price holds in the long run, then prices are cointegrated, and β′ = (1 -1, -
1). 
 Employing the Wold Representation Theorem on Equation (1.8) yields: 
 1 1 2 2 ( )t t t t tp L               (1.9) 
where each i  is a 3 × 3 vector moving average (VMA) matrix. Next, the Beveridge and 








p p L 
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     (1.10) 
where (1) 1 2I       , and measures the long-run impact of a shock to the level 
of prices, and Ψ
*
 is a matrix polynomial. Estimating the (1)  matrix is the cornerstone of 
the analysis since the elements contain information about the permanent effect that each 
of the innovations exert on the long-run dynamics of the prices. The values of the (1)  
elements can be backed out of the parameterized VEC model Equation (1.8) by 
computing the impulse response functions. 
 To derive the permanent impacts associated with price innovations, I apply Stock 
and Watson’s (1988) common trends representation for cointegrated systems, in which:  
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Each ij represents the permanent impact on price i of an innovation in price j. For 
example, ,HOME NYSE   is the long-run impact on the home market price of a shock to the 
NYSE price, ,HOME E is the long-run impact of a shock to the home market price of a 
shock to the exchange rate, etc. Given that the elements in the vector  pt  are ordered as 
, ,, ,HOME t NYSE tP P and / ,H USE  the first row of (1) t , 
, , , , , ,HOME HOME HOME t HOME NYSE NYSE t HOME E E t       , gives the long-run component of the 
innovations that are permanently impounded in the home market price.  
 The coefficients ,HOME E and ,NYSE E  measure the long-run impacts of a shock to 
the exchange rate on prices on the home market and the NYSE, respectively. These 
coefficients are particularly important because they capture any asymmetric responses of 
stock prices to changes in exchange rates, and are used to measure the NYSE burden to 
adjust to exchange rates (or TRP). 















  (1.12) 
Either ,HOME tP must respond (as measured by ,HOME E ) to the exchange rate shock, or 
,NYSE tP  must respond (as measured by ,NYSE E )  to the exchange rate shock, or both series 
must respond. The sum of both parameters (in absolute value) can be interpreted as the 
combined total response to an exchange rate shock. If responses to an exchange rate 
shock are symmetric then TRP will equal 0.5. On the other hand, a high TRP indicates 





 To date, no study focuses explicitly on the identification of markets that bear the 
brunt of the exchange rate burden across a diverse set of firms. There is no reason to 
expect that markets will respond symmetrically to exchange rate shocks such that TRP 
equals 50%. Robust tests of exchange rate effects are offered in the current study that 
examines a diverse sample in terms of individual companies, industry affiliations, and 
countries, as well as a more volatile currency time period and intraday trading overlaps.
3
      
1.2. Data 
I use tick-by-tick quote and price data from the Securities Industry Research Centre of 
Asia-Pacific (SIRCA) database, which is the standard source for international intraday 
data. SIRCA receives the original data from Thomson-Reuters, and provides global 
intraday trade, quote, and market depth for stocks and other instruments.
4
 Data used in 
the cross-sectional tests are derived from Datastream, Bloomberg, and SEC filings. My 
sample includes 10 Mexican, 13 Brazilian, and 23 Canadian cross-listings for 2008. I 
adjust U.S. prices for changes in the exchange rate using intraday bid and ask exchange 
rate quotes obtained from Olsen and Associates. The following steps summarize my data 
collection and management procedures. 
  Starting with the raw tick-by-tick quote data, I create 1-minute interval data 
points. I drop observations with a spread equal to or less than 0, then capture the closing 
bid/ask quote for each minute and assign it to that minute-interval. Obvious data errors 
                                                 
3
 Although not focused on the identification of markets that bear the brunt of the exchange rate burden, 
Grammig et al. (2005) conduct tests on three German stocks that cross-list onto the NYSE and find that 
New York prices respond more than Frankfurt prices to exchange rates. Their result is not surprising in 
light of their limited sample from a dominant home market. The main purpose of their study is offer 
simulations of the effects of endogenizing exchange rates, not on empirical tests of exchange rate burdens. 
For example, their empirical data are characterized  by brief intraday trading overlaps (25% of the trading 
day), limited sample size, and stable exchange rates.  
4
 Thomson Reuters Tick History provides millisecond time-stamped data for over 35 million OTC 





(negative spreads, zero spreads, or outrageous spreads) are eliminated.
5
 In my final 
screen for errors, I filter the data using the Billor et al. (2000) blocked adaptive 
computationally efficient outlier nominators (BACON) method. The BACON approach is 
computationally efficient, and is particularly appropriate for large datasets. The BACON 
method begins by identifying a subset of the sample (called the “basic sample”) that is 
“safely” free of outliers. Then, the method iteratively expands on the basic sample by 
creating a new basic sample containing observations with acceptable Mahalonobis 
distances relative to the previous basic sample median (or mean). The acceptable distance 
is chosen using a percentile of the chi-square distribution. Billor et al. used the 95
th
 
percentile in their simulation. The iterations continue until the size of the basic sample 
stabilizes. I replace all outliers with quote data from the previous minute. As explained by 
Hasbrouck (2007), unlike transactions data, quote-midpoints can be propagated forward 
because bid-ask quotes are considered open until a change is reported. 
 To avoid the disproportionate loss of observations clustered around significant 
volatility events, I applied the procedures in a univariate manner to each stock separately 
for each day. I also visually inspected every stock in the sample for data errors by 
graphing prices and exchange rates at 1-minute intervals. The procedures did very well 
identifying outliers without loss of information. Note that it is common to filter 
microstructure data, as pointed out in many microstructure papers (see, for example, 
Kryzanoski and Zhang (2002) and Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996)).
6
  
                                                 
5
 I define an outrageous spread as greater than 70% of the quote midpoint. Garfinkel (2009), Chung and 
Zhang (2009) delete observations where the bid-ask spread is greater than 50% of the quote-midpoint. 
Thus, my method is more relaxed than others. Some valid observations, especially in Brazil or Mexico, 
would be eliminated if I used the same cut-off that they use for their NYSE samples. 






 I exclude stocks that split during 2008. As explained in Eun and Sabherwal 
(2003), stock splits in the home and NYSE exchanges can differ by several days 
(typically a week), which would cause data synchronicity problems in my tests. 
1.3. Testable Propositions 
I examine three propositions. First, I examine the proposition that most of the exchange 
rate burden for cross-listings is borne on the foreign market, i.e., on the NYSE. A TRP 
estimate that significantly exceeds 50% will support the proposition. Second, I examine 
the proposition that the combined markets’ burdens to adjust to exchange rates rises 
during crisis periods. This proposition is supported if the sum of the absolute value psi 
estimates ,HOME E  and ,NYSE E increases significantly in the crisis period versus the pre-
crisis period. Third, I examine the proposition that the burden to adjust to exchange rates 
is related to trading volume, and firm size advantages (e.g., that the NYSE burden to 
adjust to exchange rates is negatively related to the NYSE trading volume as a percentage 
of total trading volume, negatively related to the HOME trading cost relative to the 
NYSE trading cost, and negatively related to firm size – a familiarity argument).  
1.4.  Results 
1.4.A. Exchange Rates Before and After September 15, 2008 
I delineate the tests before and after the September 15, 2008 announcement of the 
Lehman Brothers bankruptcy declaration. Uncertainties in global markets began rising 
around September 7 when Government Sponsored Enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac were placed in government conservatorship by the Federal Housing Finance 
Agency. But, the September 15 Lehman Brothers bankruptcy announcement jolted 





Lehman announcement, reeling Merrill Lynch was sold to Bank of America, and the Fed 
injected enormous amounts of cash into the banking system including $85 billion to AIG 
alone. The S&P500 fell nearly 5% on September 15 and the VIX soared an 
unprecedented 24%, making it the worst stock market day in seven years. On September 
25, facilitated by the FDIC, J. P. Morgan acquired failed Washington Mutual Savings and 
Loan, which was the largest bank failure in U.S. history. On October 3, Wells Fargo 
announced plans to acquire failing Wachovia Corporation, and on the same day, 
Congress passed the largest financial bailout in history totaling $700 billion in bailout 
money. The S&P500 dropped nearly 10% over the 2-day period October 6 and 7 after the 
Fed announced it would make up to $900 billion available to U.S. banks through its Term 
Auction lending facility. 
 The unprecedented events in the latter part of 2008 also had significant effects on 
exchange rates, as demand for U.S. dollars soared. For example, from September 15 
through the end of 2008, the U.S. dollar rose over 15% relative to the Canadian dollar, 
32% relative to the Brazilian real, and 30% relative to the Mexican peso. Figure 1.1 
illustrates the spike in exchange rate volatility after mid-September 2008 at the time of 
the Lehman Brothers announcement.  
 To better understand the burden of different stocks and markets to respond to 
exchange rates, I conduct all my tests on individual stocks separately for all trading days 
from January 1, 2008 through September 14, 2008 (“low exchange rate volatility” 
period), and for all trading days from September 15, 2008 through December 31, 2008 
(“high exchange rate volatility” period). The latter period tests offer a unique 





particular note is the simulation of Grammig et al. (2008) showing that price discovery 
inferences are dramatically affected by volatile exchange rates. The study of the latter 
part of 2008 offers an important empirical test of the simulation conclusions. 
1.4.B. Market Characteristics 
Tables 1.1 – 1.3 present market characteristics for each of the sampled stocks in Canada, 
Brazil, and Mexico, respectively. The tables report the company name, industry 
affiliation, NYSE listing date, NYSE volume as a percentage of total volume trading on 
the two exchanges, relative cost ratio, and USD total assets. NYSE % Volume of Total 
equals the U.S. dollar value of trading volume on the NYSE divided by the combined 
U.S. dollar value of trading volume on the NYSE and the home exchange. A percentage 
above 50% indicates that greater volume traded on the NYSE relative to the home 
exchange. Cost Ratio is calculated as follows: for each exchange, for each minute, I 
calculate the percent bid-ask spread equal to the ask price minus the bid price, divided by 
the midpoint of the two prices. The Cost Ratio equals the percent bid-ask spread for the 
home exchange divided by the percent bid-ask spread for the NYSE exchange. A Cost 
Ratio above one indicates spreads are relatively larger on the home exchange versus the 
NYSE. Sample-wide averages and medians are presented at the bottom of each table. 
 Results for the Canadian sample indicate that, on average, trading volume was 
higher on the TSE (NYSE % Volume of Total was less than 50% for most of the stocks), 
and bid-ask spreads were smaller (Cost Ratio was less than 1 for most of the stocks). 
These findings indicate that the TSE maintained a cost and trading volume advantage 





 For the Brazilian sample (Table 1.2), trading volume and percent bid-ask spreads 
were lower on the NYSE for most stocks. Cosan Limited stands out as an outlier, in 
which most of the trading occurred on the NYSE. Therefore, the abnormal cost ratio for 
Cosan Limited is not meaningful. For the Mexican sample (Table 1.3), trading volume is 
higher, and the percent bid-ask spreads are lower on the NYSE for most stocks.    
 In summary, the three markets exhibit wide differences in characteristics. For 
Canadian cross-listings, the TSE dominates the NYSE on both trading volume and cost. 
For Brazilian ADRs, trading volume favors the BOVESPA, but cost favors the NYSE. 
And, for Mexican ADRs, both trading volume and cost favor the NYSE. The lack of 
dominance of the home market for Mexico and Brazil adds to the robustness of our tests, 
and offers a major contrast with existing studies of cross-listing price discovery (Ding et 
al. (1999), Solnik (1996), Lieberman et al. (1999), Bacidore and Sofianos (2002), Wang 
(2002), and Eun and Sabherwal (2003a, 2003b), and Harris et al. (2007)). Not 
surprisingly, cross-listing studies of dominant home markets find that home markets also 
dominate the price discovery process.  However, the robustness of price discovery tests is 
weakened when restricted to dominant home markets. 
1.4.C. Cointegration Tests 
Before estimating the vector error correction model, I determine the number of lags in the 
model using the Schwarz Bayesian Information Criterion (Schwarz (1978)). Then, I use 
Johansen’s (1988) method to test for cointegration, and confirm that there is only one 
cointegrating vector.
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 The results of the Johansen’s (1988) rank test method support the 
hypothesis of one cointegrating vector among the three price series (prices at home, 
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 Critical values (for models where the cointegrating vector  is ( 1)n  and n  is greater than 2) are 





prices on the NYSE, and the exchange rate). The cointegrating vectors are estimated 
using Johansen’s (1995) maximum likelihood method and are reported in Tables 1.4 to 
1.6. The results offer strong support for the theoretical values discussed in section II.C. 
The median cointegrating vectors, rounded to two decimal places, are (1.00,-1.00,-1.00) 
over both periods for all countries. This finding indicates that prices converge after 
adjusting for exchange rates. The prices do not deviate without bound, and subsequently 
tend to correct toward each other.  
1.4.D. Impulse Response Functions 
The vector moving average ψ matrices form the basis of analysis to show the time 
evolution of the effect on stock prices of a one-time shock to exchange rates. One might 
suspect that because the NYSE is a derivative or satellite market relative to the home 
market, that the NYSE will bear most of the adjustment to exchange rate changes. 
However, the NYSE is the most liquid, transparent, and recognized exchange in the 
world and the U.S. is a leading financial center and importer of foreign goods. In this 
case, NYSE prices might offer information to which the home market responds. 
Therefore, it is unclear the extent to which the NYSE will bear the burden to adjust to 
exchange rate shocks. Only the empirical analysis can reveal the true relations.  
 I simulate the vector error correction models to derive impulse response functions 
(IRF) for each stock. The IRFs illustrate the impact on stock prices of a 1-time, 1-unit 
increase to /H USE ; i.e., a depreciation in the home currency relative to the U.S. dollar, or, 
alternatively, an appreciation of the U.S. dollar relative to the home currency. The Ψ(1) 
matrix consists of the permanent effects (i.e., the values to which the impulse response 





IRFs for each of the sampled stocks, I plot the IRF for three stocks for each market: the 
stocks with the smallest, median, and largest translation risk percentage (TRP).  
 Figure 1.2 illustrates the IRFs.  Each IRF extends 500 steps ahead. Each step 
represents 1 minute in time. A positive shock to /H USE is expected to cause stock prices to 
rise in the home exchange and/or to fall on the NYSE. The left side panel presents IRFs 
for stocks with the smallest TRP within Brazil, Mexico, and Canada, respectively. The 
middle panel presents IRFs for stocks with the median TRP within each market.  The 
right side panel presents IRFs for stocks with the largest TRP within each market. TRP 
equals the burden of the NYSE price to adjust to changes in exchange rates, relative to 
the combined adjustment of the NYSE and home exchanges. The exact response for each 
stock is determined by the TRP for the stock. A high TRP indicates that the NYSE prices 
bear most of the burden to adjust to the exchange rate shock (the right side IRFs for each 
market in Figure 1.2). A low TRP indicates that the NYSE prices bear little of the burden 
to adjust to the exchange rate shock (the left side IRFs for each market in Figure 1.2).   
 Very interesting patterns emerge in the IRFs. In contrast to claims made on 
limited samples by Grammig et al. (2005) and Frijns et al. (2010), my findings show that 
stocks do not respond similarly to exchange rate shocks. In particular, the left and right 
side panels reveal stark contrasts, illustrating dramatic differences in responses of prices 
to the exchange rate shock. The middle panel offers the median tendency for each 
country, and illustrate how New York prices tend to respond more than home prices to 
the exchange rate shocks for Canadian and Mexican securities, and how home prices are 





rate shock are persistent – the impacts level off after about 20 to 50 minutes (which is 
similar to the findings of Eun and Sabherwal (2003) and Grammig et al. (2005)).
8
    
1.4.E. Permanent Impulse Response Coefficients 
The elements of the Ψ(1) matrix consist of the permanent impulse response coefficients 
or price impact coefficients. ,HOME E is the home price impact associated with exchange 
rate changes, and ,NYSE E is the NYSE price impact associated with exchange rate 
changes. If I find that , ,ˆ ˆNYSE E HOME E   (e.g., TRP > 50%), then I can conclude that the 
NYSE bears over half of the exchange rate burden. In their study of three blue chip 
German stocks, Grammig et al. (2005) find that “New York prices bear almost all of the 
adjustment to exchange rate changes” (p 162). But, little is known about pricing 
dynamics for cross-listings domiciled in less dominant home stock markets such as 
Mexico and Brazil. There is little reason to believe that the brief overlapping trading 
results for three blue chip German stocks can be generalized for all stocks for all markets.  
 Paired coordinates for ,HOME E  and ,NYSE E  are graphed in Figure 1.3. For each 
firm, ,HOME E is graphed on the Y-axis and ,NYSE E is graphed on the X-axis. Points that 
fall near the 45 degree line indicate a more symmetric response to exchange rate shocks 
(i.e., equal burden for the NYSE versus home prices to adjust to exchange rate shocks). 
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 Eun and Sabherwal (2003) examine an equally-weighted portfolio of Canadian cross-listings, and find 
that the response of the NYSE portfolio to exchange rate shocks far exceeds the response of the TSE 
portfolio. More recently, Frijns et al. (2010) examine exchange rate effects for nine stocks cross-listing 
between Australia and New Zealand. Similar to Grammig et al.(2005), the authors find that the foreign 
market bears most of the burden to adjust to exchange rate shocks. A major limitation to these studies lies 
in the examination of dominant home markets only, the examination of fairly stable exchange rate periods, 






Points that fall below the 45 degree line correspond to firms in which NYSE prices bore 
the larger burden to adjust to exchange rates.  
 Five findings emerge from the psi estimates in Tables 1.4 – 1.6 and Figure 1.3. 
For the time being I focus on the sample-wide results. Discussion of country-specific 
findings will be offered when I discuss the results reframed as TRPs. First, Tables 1.4 – 
1.6 show that all estimates have the expected signs: ,ˆHOME E values are positive and 
,
ˆ
NYSE E are negative for every stock.
9
 Second, Figure 1.3 shows that the ψ estimates are 
widely dispersed across stocks within the same market, implying that the burden to adjust 
to exchange rates is a stock specific effect, and not a market-wide effect. Third, the ψ 
estimates in Figure 1.3 rarely lie close to the 45 degree line, implying that the NYSE and 
home burden to adjust to exchange rates is similar only in rare cases. Fourth, the 
dispersion of the ψ estimates in Figure 1.3 widens during the high exchange rate volatility 
period within each market. The increased dispersion may be attributable to increased 
dispersion in stock specific characteristics such as bid-ask spreads and trading volume, 
but also may be attributable to the dramatic rise in exchange rate volatility.
10
 And, fifth, 
the NYSE bears less of the exchange rate burden for a substantial number of firms. 
Specifically, 21 of the 46 points (46%) lie above the 45 degree line in the low exchange 
rate volatility period, and 19 of the 46 points (41%) lie above the 45 degree line in the 
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 ,HOME E  is the response of the home stock price to a 1-unit shock in the home price of one U.S. dollar (
/H USE ), and ,NYSE E  is the response of the New York price to a 1-unit shock in /H USE . A 1-unit shock in 
/H USE implies a depreciation (appreciation) of the home (U.S. dollar) currency versus the U.S. dollar (home 
currency). Therefore, in response to the /H USE shock, we should expect the home exchange price to rise,
,
ˆ 0,HOME E   and/or the New York price to fall ,ˆ 0NYSE E   to meet the new equilibrium price. 
10
 Sample-wide medians presented in Tables 1.1 – 1.3 indicate trading volume and cost variables are fairly 





high exchange rate volatility period. This finding contrasts others that claim that the 
NYSE should bear all of the exchange rate burden. 
 The results show that both price series respond to exchange rate shocks. In order 
to compare the magnitudes of the ,HOME E  and ,NYSE E  estimates, I perform likelihood 
ratio tests to test the null hypothesis that ,HOME E = ,NYSE E . The null hypothesis of 
equality of the two psi estimates is rejected at the 5 percent level of significance for 34 
(36) of the 46 firms during the period of low (high) exchange rate volatility. Of the 34 
significant differences during the period of low exchange rate volatility, 14 are positive 
and 20 are negative. Of the 36 significant differences during the period of high exchange 
rate volatility, 13 are positive and 23 are negative. Also, when averaging over the total 
sample of 46 cross-listings, I conducted a paired t-test that controls for cross-correlation 
in the psi estimates. The t-statistic for equality of sample-wide averages, 
, , 0HOME E NYSE E   , equals -1.84 (p-value = 0.072) for the period of high exchange 
rate volatility, equals -1.72 (p-value = 0.092) for the period of low exchange rate 
volatility, and equals -2.49 (p-value = 0.014) when combining both periods. A negative 
difference indicates that the NYSE burden ( ,NYSE E ) to adjust to exchange rates is larger 
in magnitude than the home exchange burden ,( ).HOME E   
 In Figure 1.4, I compare the combined markets’ burden to adjust to exchange rate 
shocks during the low versus the high exchange rate volatility periods. The sum of 
,HOME E  and ,NYSE E measures the combined burden of the home market and the NYSE 
to adjust to exchange rates. In Figure 1.4, for each firm the sum of ,HOME E  and ,NYSE E





calculated for the high exchange rate volatility period is graphed on the X-axis. Points 
that lie below the 45 degree line signify firms that experienced an increase in the 
combined markets’ burden to adjust to exchange rates during the period of high exchange 
rate volatility.  
 As illustrated in Figure 1.4, the overall burden of adjusting to exchange rate 
shocks (the sum of ,ˆHOME E and the absolute value of ,ˆNYSE E ) increased during the period 
of high exchange rate volatility for the majority of firms. Specifically, the overall burden 
rose for 31 of the 46 firms, (t-statistic for difference of percentage from 50% equals 
2.52). Therefore, the dramatic rise in exchange rate volatility had a likewise dramatic 
effect on the combined burdens of stock prices in the two markets to adjust to exchange 
rate shocks. 
 Results of the TRP tests are reported in Tables 1.4 – 1.6, for Canada, Brazil, and 
Mexico, respectively. For the Canadian results in Table 1.4, the mean (median) TRP 
equals 59% (69%) versus 62% (71%) for the period of low versus high exchange rate 
volatility. The coefficients exhibit wide cross-sectional variation, with a standard 
deviation of 0.27 for the period of low exchange rate volatility, and 0.32 for the period of 
high exchange rate volatility. The NYSE burden exceeds the home burden for 65% (61%) 
of the sample during the period of low (high) exchange rate volatility. Both percentages 
significantly exceed 50% (t-statistics for difference from 50% equal 3.42 and 2.33, 
respectively). And, the psi estimates are statistically significant at the 5% level in nearly 
every case. These results confirm that, while the NYSE bore more of the burden, both 
markets bore significant burdens to adjust to exchange rate shocks. In contrast, Grammig 





burden of adjustment to exchange rate changes. My tests show that these earlier claims 
are sample specific, and, therefore, the generalizations are misleading. When examining a 
more robust set of firms, I find that the burden of prices to adjust to exchange rates is not 
borne primarily by the foreign market.  
 Results for the Brazilian sample differ markedly from the Canadian results. For 
the Brazilian results in Table 1.5, the mean (median) TRP equals 44% (44%) versus 47% 
(50%) when comparing the periods of low versus high exchange rate volatility.
11
 Relative 
to the Canadian results, the TRPs are more closely clustered (standard deviations of 0.11 
and 0.24 for the periods of low and high exchange rate volatility, respectively). Thus, 
there is considerably more homogeneity among the TRPs for the Brazilian sample versus 
the Canadian sample. The NYSE burden exceeds the home burden only 23% of the time 
during the period of low exchange rate volatility (significantly less than 50%; t-statistic 
for difference from 50% equals -5.47). This percentage rises to 51% during the period of 
high exchange rate volatility. The Brazilian results indicate that, relative to BOVESPA 
prices, NYSE prices bear far less of the burden to adjust to exchange rate shocks during 
the low exchange rate volatility period, but that the burden was fairly evenly shared 
during the high exchange rate volatility period. It should be noted that most of the psi 
estimates are significant at the 5% level in each period, once again implying that both 
markets bore at least part of the exchange rate burden.  
 The Mexican sample results are reported in Table 1.6.  The mean (median) TRP 
equals 61% (62%) versus 57% (57%) for the periods of low versus high exchange rate 
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shares takes place on the NYSE. Not surprisingly, the burden of Cosan share prices to adjust to exchange 
rate shocks lies with the BOVESPA. It is likely that the BOVESPA lags the NYSE for changes in Cosan’s 






volatility. The Mexican results exhibit more homogeneity than the Canadian results 
(standard deviation approximately 0.20 in each period). The NYSE burden exceeds the 
home burden 70% of the time during the low exchange rate volatility period 
(significantly greater than 50%; t-statistic for difference from 50% equals 3.01), and 60% 
of the time during the high exchange rate volatility period (t-statistic for difference from 
50% equals 1.32). In general, tests on Mexican cross-listings show that the NYSE 
investor bears more of the exchange rate burden than the home investor. Summary 
statistics for the TRP estimates for the three markets are provided in Table 1.7.  
1.4.F. Cross-Sectional TRP Tests 
Table 1.8 reports averages for quintile portfolios formed based on TRP (the translation 
risk percentage defined in Equation (1.12), which measures the relative burden of the 
NYSE price to adjust to exchange rate shocks. Quintile 1 consists of the lowest TRP 
quintile, and quintile 5 consists of the largest TRP quintile. NYSE % Volume of Total 
equals the trading volume in USD divided by the sum of the USD denominated trading 
volume on both the NYSE and home exchange. The Cost Ratio equals the percentage 
bid-ask quote spread on the home exchange divided by the percentage bid-ask quote 
spread on the NYSE. Size equals total assets in thousands USD. Emerging equals the 
percentage of the group consisting of emerging market stocks. While small sample 
caveats are in order, it is important to note that my sample size is among the largest of 
any high frequency price discovery study.  
 The quintile results reveal interesting monotonic patterns. The NYSE’s relative 
share of total trading volume generally falls from TRP quintile 1 through TRP quintile 5. 





Although not as clear, size is larger for the higher TRP quintiles than for the lower TPR 
quintiles. If size is a proxy for familiarity, then our results suggest that the NYSE share of 
the exchange rate burden is higher for the more familiar firms. The final column shows 
that TRP quintile 5 consists mainly of Canadian stocks (the emerging market composition 
in quintile 5 is well below 50%). In summary, the results show that the NYSE share of 
the exchange rate burden tends to be higher for larger firms, and for those with lower 
trading volumes on the NYSE relative to the home market, and lower costs on the home 
exchange relative to the NYSE. 
 I also run cross-sectional regressions of TRP against NYSE % of Total Volume, 
Cost Ratio, and the natural logarithm  of total assets. The regressions are run individually 
to avoid multicollinearity problems that exist especially between COST and VOL. The 
regressions pool the data across both time periods, and include an interaction dummy 
variable to measure changes in slopes between the low and high exchange rate volatility 
periods.    
 Results are consistent with the quintile results. The VOL slope coefficient is 
significant at the 0.05 level, and COST and SIZE slope coefficients are significant at the 
0.10 level. The signs of the slopes are consistent with the quintile results; namely that 
TRP is negatively related to both VOL and COST, and is positively related to SIZE. 
Slope coefficients intensify during the period of high exchange rate volatility (i.e., the 
signs on the interaction terms are identical to the variable’s coefficients), however, the 
interaction term coefficients are not statistically significant. 
1.5.  Conclusions 
In this study, I examined the informational role of exchange rates in the price formation 





price impacts of exchange rate shocks. Using a sample of 46 cross-listings on the NYSE 
from Canada, Brazil, and Mexico during 2008, I found that New York prices bore 
roughly 60% of the adjustment to exchange rates for Canadian and Mexican securities, 
and roughly 45% for Brazilian securities. These findings showed that price adjustments 
from exchange rate shocks transpired on both the home exchange and the NYSE. 
Therefore, it is not the case that foreign prices (e.g., NYSE prices) bear nearly all the 
burden to adjust to exchange rates, as suggested in existing studies that examine less 
diverse sets of stocks and markets. 
 Findings varied considerably across firms, indicating that the effects of exchange 
rate shocks are not market-based, but more likely are firm-specific. For the majority of 
firms, the combined markets’ burdens to adjust to exchange rate shocks rose during the 
period of high exchange rate volatility. This finding suggests that traditional price 
discovery measures such as Hasbrouck’s (1995) information shares become increasingly 
affected by exchange rate effects versus firm-specific fundamental news effects during 
periods of increasing exchange rate volatility.  
 Cross-sectional tests revealed that the NYSE burden to adjust to exchange rate 
changes is highest for big firms, and for those with relatively low NYSE trading volume, 
or with high NYSE trading costs. The findings indicate that the burden to adjust to 
exchange rates is likely to shift more to emerging market exchanges as the migration of 
trading volume to the NYSE increases. The results also have important implications for 
international price discovery tests, especially for those that fail to model an independent 










Canadian Sample Summary 
 
This table lists the Canadian companies by name, industry, NYSE listing date, relative trading volume, cost, and size. The low 
exchange rate volatility period (Low Vol) spans all trading days in January 1, 2008 – September 14, 2008. The high exchange 
rate volatility period (High Vol) spans all trading days in September 15, 2008 – December 31, 2008. September 15, 2008 is the 
date of the Lehman Brother. bankruptcy declaration and the start of  market turmoil and volatility.  
 
Total Assets
Company Industry Listing Date Low Vol High Vol Low Vol High Vol U.S. $000
Brookfield Asset Management Inc Financial 7/10/1998 0.3360 0.3804 1.1040 0.8152 57430
Bank of Montreal Banking 10/5/2005 0.0805 0.0715 0.6086 0.4478 366538
Bank of Nova Scotia Banking 1/2/1996 0.0737 0.0507 0.5815 0.4143 449944
Brookfield Properties Corp Real Estate 1/2/1996 0.6240 0.6728 1.4088 1.0432 20391
Biovail Corporation International Pharmaceuticals 6/2/1999 0.3625 0.3074 1.1755 1.1456 1732
Celestica Inc. Electronics Manufacturing 5/10/2000 0.3844 0.2965 1.1867 1.1974 4457
Canadian Imperial Bank Banking 7/1/1998 0.0764 0.0814 0.5530 0.4541 330593
Canadian Natural Resources Limited Oil and Gas 1/2/1996 0.2657 0.2185 0.8285 0.5369 37576
Canadian Pacific Railway Transportation 2/1/2003 0.2604 0.3284 0.7976 0.7224 13292
Enbridge Inc. Oil and Gas 1/2/1996 0.1578 0.1738 0.7178 0.5462 20215
Fairfax Financial Insurance 6/6/1997 0.3616 0.2812 0.8904 0.5605 27565
Gildan ActiveWear Apparel 10/30/2001 0.3290 0.3586 1.0177 0.9185 8670
Gainsco Insurance 7/23/1996 0.4181 0.3560 1.0523 0.8650 1053
Manulife Financial Financial Services 6/10/1998 0.1777 0.1313 0.9005 0.5501 350553
Nova Chemicals Chemicals 7/31/1996 0.4185 0.3724 1.0238 0.8567 4914
Northern Telecom Switching equipment 3/9/1996 0.4589 0.3033 1.1744 0.7102 16315
Nexen Inc Oil and Gas 7/11/1998 0.2071 0.2030 0.8866 0.6019 19731
Ritchie Brothers Auctioners Industrial Equipment 1/1/1996 0.6341 0.5499 1.6196 1.5255 841
Sun Life Financial Insurance 11/14/2000 0.1518 0.1028 0.7054 0.5585 184485
Toronto Dominion Bank Banking 11/14/2002 0.1641 0.1084 0.8538 0.5283 497902
Tim Hortons Inc Restaurant 1/2/1996 0.3509 0.3437 1.2430 0.9756 1737
TransCanada Pipeline Oil and Gas 8/30/1996 0.0846 0.1093 0.6679 0.5258 31022
Domtar Corporation Paper Products 3/22/2006 0.7798 0.8917 1.8711 2.0779 7631
Averages 0.3112 0.2910 0.9943 0.8077 106721
Medians 0.3290 0.2965 0.9005 0.7102 20215










Brazilian Sample Summary 
 
This table lists the Brazilian companies by name, industry, and NYSE listing date and relative trading volume, cost, and price 
characteristics. NYSE % Volume of Total is trading volume expressed in USD on the NYSE divided by the USD denominated 
trading volume on both the NYSE and the BOVESPA. The percentage bid-ask quote equals the ask price minus the bid price, 
divided by the midpoint of the two prices. The percentage bid-ask quote is calculated for every 1-minute interval, for each 
stock. For each minute, the Cost Ratio equals the percentage quote spread on the home exchange divided by the percentage 
quote spread on the NYSE. To calculate the exchange rate adjusted home stock price quote, for each minute, the midpoint of 
the 1-minute exchange rate bid and ask price quotes is multiplied times the midpoint of the home stock bid and ask price.  
 
Total Assets
Company Industry Listing Date Low Vol High Vol Low Vol High Vol U.S. $000
Braskem Chemicals 8/31/2002 0.1906 0.2166 1.3098 1.2438 12283
Companhia Brasil de Distribuição Food 5/31/1997 0.4332 0.4497 2.2395 1.7960 7475
SABESP Utilities 5/10/2002 0.5414 0.5577 1.8387 1.6929 10854
Comp Energetica de Minas Gerais Energy 8/16/1996 0.3099 0.3360 1.7451 1.2880 14160
Compania  Paranaense de Energia Energy 7/30/1997 0.2626 0.2578 1.7470 1.1841 7295
Cosan Limited Sugar/Ethanol 8/14/2007 0.9035 0.9523 11.7228 11.3670 5187
CPFL Energia Energy 1/2/1996 0.3504 0.2548 1.2416 0.9679 9081
Embraer-Empresa Brasileira de Aeronautica Aerospace 7/18/2000 0.5701 0.6092 2.6192 2.4402 8412
Votorantim Celulose e Papel S.A. Paper 4/8/2000 0.4921 0.4882 2.4164 2.0543 6806
Gafisa Home Construction 3/14/2007 0.4664 0.4356 1.5705 1.3019 2039
GOL Linhas Aéreas Inteligentes Airline 6/23/2004 0.3864 0.3262 1.5344 1.3071 3032
TAM-Companhia de Investimentos em Transportes Airline 3/9/2006 0.4172 0.4000 1.9120 1.8008 3762
Tele Norte Leste Participacoes Telecomm 11/18/1998 0.3909 0.4390 2.3988 1.8888 18243
Averages 0.4396 0.4402 2.6381 2.3333 8356
Medians 0.4172 0.4356 1.8387 1.6929 7475










Mexican Sample Summary 
 
This table lists the Mexican companies by name, industry, and NYSE listing date and relative trading volume, cost, and price 
characteristics. NYSE % Volume of Total is trading volume expressed in USD on the NYSE divided by the USD denominated trading 
volume on both the NYSE and the BOLSA. The percentage bid-ask quote equals the ask price minus the bid price, divided by the 
midpoint of the two prices. The percentage bid-ask quote is calculated for every 1-minute interval, for each stock. For each minute, the 
Cost Ratio equals the percentage quote spread on the home exchange divided by the percentage quote spread on the NYSE. To calculate 
the exchange rate adjusted home stock price quote, for each minute, the midpoint of the 1-minute exchange rate bid and ask price quotes is 




Company Industry Listing Date Low Vol High Vol Low Vol High Vol U.S. $000
America Movil Telecomm 1/2/1996 0.5058 0.4805 2.5064 1.8084 33540
Grupo Aeroportuario del Sureste Industrials 2/26/2006 0.6110 0.5745 1.6153 1.4894 1593
Cemex Building Materials 1/1/1996 0.5441 0.4888 2.9486 1.9905 51063
Fomento Economico Mexicano Beverage 5/9/1998 0.5983 0.5773 2.4943 1.9159 15965
Grupo Simec Mining and Metals 1/2/1996 0.4572 0.4142 2.2429 1.9072 2433
Desarrolladora Homex Housing 6/29/2004 0.5713 0.5779 1.9893 1.5985 2407
Industrias Bachoco Food 9/22/1997 0.9216 0.7439 3.7120 3.0723 1834
Empresas ICA Construction 1/2/1996 0.1365 0.1118 1.2711 0.8974 3967
Coca Cola Femsa Beverage 1/2/1996 0.8549 0.7909 4.2788 3.4877 8320
Grupo Aeroportuario del Pacifico Transportation 1/2/1996 0.5558 0.6467 2.2931 3.2372 2628
Averages 0.5757 0.5407 2.5352 2.1404 12375
Medians 0.5635 0.5759 2.3937 1.9115 3298










Exchange Rate Effects for the Canadian Sample 
 
This table reports cointegrating vector coefficients and permanent foreign exchange impulse response coefficients for the Canadian stock 
sample. The ψHOME,E  (ψNYSE,E) columns present impulse response coefficients measuring the effect that U.S. dollar to Canadian dollar 
exchange rate changes have on the TSE (NYSE) price of each stock. The TRP column presents the translation risk percent equal to the 
absolute value of the ψNYSE,E estimate divided by the sum of the estimates of ψHOME,E  and absolute value  ψNYSE,E. The final column presents 




All underlined coefficients are insignificant at the 5% level. All non-underlined coefficients are significant at the 5% level. 
High minus
Company Name ψHOME,E ψNYSE,E TRP ψHOME,E ψNYSE,E TRP Low
Brookfield Asset Mgmt 1 -0.9995 -1.0025 0.1068 -0.7933 0.8814 1 -1.0000 -1.0005 0.7081 -0.1002 0.1240 -0.7574
Bank of Montreal 1 -1.0000 -0.9998 0.1244 -0.7214 0.8529 1 -0.9998 -1.0045 0.0867 -0.8924 0.9114 0.0585
Bank of Nova Scotia 1 -1.0000 -1.0007 0.0674 -0.6660 0.9081 1 -0.9999 -1.0020 0.1571 -0.7857 0.8334 -0.0748
Brookfield Properties 1 -1.0000 -0.9994 0.5495 -0.2947 0.3491 1 -0.9998 -1.0019 0.7139 -0.1113 0.1349 -0.2142
Biovail Corporation Int'l 1 -1.0000 -0.9994 0.4757 -0.3525 0.4256 1 -1.0002 -1.0013 0.5312 -0.3712 0.4113 -0.0143
Celestica Inc. 1 -1.0001 -1.0008 0.6717 -0.2287 0.2540 1 -0.9998 -1.0015 0.3014 -0.7050 0.7005 0.4465
Canadian Imperial Bank 1 -1.0000 -1.0005 0.1946 -0.5038 0.7213 1 -0.9996 -1.0043 0.0000 -1.0000 1.0000 0.2787
Canadian Natural Resources 1 -1.0000 -0.9997 0.1751 -0.6906 0.7977 1 -1.0000 -1.0000 0.6640 -0.2146 0.2443 -0.5535
Canadian Pacific Railway 1 -1.0000 -1.0004 0.4497 -0.2714 0.3763 1 -1.0000 -0.9988 0.4485 -0.4386 0.4944 0.1181
Enbridge 1 -1.0000 -0.9997 0.1933 -0.4593 0.7039 1 -1.0002 -0.9990 0.0853 -0.7347 0.8959 0.1921
Fairfax Financial 1 -1.0000 -0.9920 0.3865 -0.5468 0.5859 1 -0.9994 -1.0094 0.0672 -0.9502 0.9340 0.3481
Gildan ActiveWear 1 -1.0000 -1.0001 0.1263 -0.7810 0.8608 1 -1.0002 -0.9959 0.8476 -0.1141 0.1186 -0.7421
Gainsco 1 -1.0000 -1.0028 0.7518 -0.0529 0.0657 1 -0.9997 -0.9925 0.7941 -0.1256 0.1366 0.0708
Manulife Financial 1 -1.0000 -1.0012 0.4988 -0.1595 0.2423 1 -0.9998 -1.0051 0.2555 -0.6254 0.7100 0.4676
Nova Chemicals 1 -1.0000 -0.9979 0.3715 -0.4628 0.5547 1 -1.0001 -0.9959 0.1016 -0.8933 0.8979 0.3432
Northern Telecom 1 -1.0000 -0.9975 0.7571 -0.1284 0.1450 1 -1.0053 -0.9291 0.0358 -0.9125 0.9622 0.8172
Nexen Inc 1 -1.0000 -1.0020 0.0920 -0.8156 0.8986 1 -1.0000 -1.0033 0.0879 -0.8687 0.9081 0.0095
Ritchie Brothers Auctioners 1 -1.0000 -0.9982 0.1217 -0.8028 0.8683 1 -0.9999 -1.0017 0.2015 -0.7829 0.7953 -0.0730
Sun Life Financial 1 -1.0000 -1.0005 0.1809 -0.6515 0.7827 1 -1.0000 -0.9989 0.3173 -0.6776 0.6811 -0.1016
Toronto Dominion Bank 1 -1.0000 -0.9997 0.2365 -0.5363 0.6939 1 -0.9999 -1.0031 0.4287 -0.3619 0.4577 -0.2362
Tim Hortons Inc 1 -1.0000 -0.9987 0.4018 -0.4292 0.5165 1 -0.9999 -1.0006 0.1416 -0.8104 0.8513 0.3348
TransCanada Pipeline 1 -1.0000 -1.0000 0.0911 -0.6828 0.8823 1 -1.0001 -1.0017 0.1989 -0.7724 0.7952 -0.0871
Domtar Corporation 1 -1.0000 -1.0009 0.6204 -0.2641 0.2986 1 -1.0003 -0.9952 0.7485 -0.2441 0.2459 -0.0527
Averages 1 -1.0000 -0.9998 0.3324 -0.4911 0.5942 1 -1.0002 -0.9977 0.3444 -0.5866 0.6193 0.0251
Medians 1 -1.0000 -1.0000 0.2365 -0.5038 0.6939 1 -1.0000 -1.0013 0.2555 -0.7050 0.7100 0.0161
             Cointegrating Vector Cointegrating Vector










Exchange Rate Effects for the Brazilian Sample 
 
This table reports cointegrating vector coefficients and permanent foreign exchange impulse response coefficients for the Brazilian stock 
sample. The ψHOME,E (ψNYSE,E) columns present impulse response coefficients measuring the effect that U.S. dollar to Brazilian real 
exchange rate changes have on the BOVESPA (NYSE) price of each stock. The TRP column presents the translation risk percent equal to 
the absolute value of the ψNYSE,E estimate divided by the sum of the estimates of ψHOME,E  and absolute value  ψNYSE,E. TRP equals  the 
adjustment borne by the NYSE relative to the total adjustment from both markets in response to changes in the U.S. dollar to Brazilian real 




All underlined coefficients are insignificant at the 5% level. All non-underlined coefficients are significant at the 5% level.
High minus
Company Name ψHOME,E ψNYSE,E TRP ψHOME,E ψNYSE,E TRP Low
Braskem 1 -1.0011 -0.9970 0.2308 -0.4546 0.6633 1 -1.0012 -0.9966 0.1660 -0.5873 0.7797 0.1164
Companhia Brasil de Distribuição 1 -0.9992 -1.0055 0.3736 -0.2573 0.4079 1 -1.0000 -0.9997 0.2526 -0.3669 0.5923 0.1844
SABESP 1 -1.0005 -0.9973 0.3608 -0.3082 0.4607 1 -1.0006 -0.9987 0.3035 -0.4036 0.5708 0.1102
Comp Energetica de Minas Gerais 1 -0.9989 -1.0054 0.2791 -0.3283 0.5405 1 -0.9997 -1.0003 0.1940 -0.4058 0.6765 0.1360
Compania  Paranaense de Energia 1 -0.9998 -1.0033 0.2982 -0.3486 0.5390 1 -1.0037 -0.9894 0.1605 -0.6010 0.7892 0.2502
Cosan Limited 1 -1.0027 -0.9822 0.5516 -0.1814 0.2475 1 -0.9874 -1.0945 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.2475
CPFL Energia 1 -0.9997 -1.0019 0.3519 -0.3155 0.4727 1 -1.0028 -0.9926 0.3283 -0.3352 0.5052 0.0325
Embraer-Empresa Brasileira de Aeronautica 1 -0.9988 -1.0065 0.4219 -0.1654 0.2816 1 -0.9976 -1.0066 0.4206 -0.2248 0.3483 0.0667
Votorantim Celulose e Papel S.A. 1 -1.0004 -0.9984 0.3851 -0.2491 0.3928 1 -1.0005 -0.9958 0.3575 -0.3562 0.4991 0.1063
Gafisa 1 -0.9995 -1.0016 0.3781 -0.2914 0.4353 1 -1.0007 -0.9984 0.5481 -0.1566 0.2222 -0.2131
GOL Linhas Aéreas Inteligentes 1 -0.9989 -1.0063 0.4081 -0.2544 0.3840 1 -1.0030 -0.9976 0.5072 -0.1464 0.2239 -0.1600
TAM-Companhia de Investimentos em Transp. 1 -0.9996 -1.0005 0.3738 -0.3091 0.4527 1 -1.0011 -0.9948 0.2853 -0.4518 0.6130 0.1603
Tele Norte Leste Participacoes 1 -1.0006 -0.9963 0.3466 -0.2665 0.4346 1 -0.9998 -1.0019 0.4626 -0.0492 0.0962 -0.3384
Averages 1 -1.0000 -1.0002 0.3661 -0.2869 0.4394 1 -0.9998 -1.0051 0.3836 -0.3142 0.4551 0.0157
Medians 1 -0.9997 -1.0016 0.3736 -0.2914 0.4353 1 -1.0006 -0.9984 0.3283 -0.3562 0.5052 0.0699
Low Vol High Vol










Exchange Rate Effects for the Mexican Sample 
 
This table reports cointegrating vector coefficients and permanent foreign exchange impulse response coefficients for the Mexican stock 
sample. The ψHOME,E  (ψNYSE,E) columns present impulse response coefficients measuring the effect that U.S. dollar to Mexican peso 
exchange rate changes have on the BOLSA (NYSE) price of each stock. The TRP column presents the translation risk percent equal to the 
absolute value of the ψNYSE,E estimate divided by the sum of the estimates of ψHOME,E  and absolute value  ψNYSE,E. TRP equals  the 
adjustment borne by the NYSE relative to the total adjustment from both markets in response to changes in the U.S. dollar to Mexican 




All underlined coefficients are insignificant at the 5% level. All non-underlined coefficients are significant at the 5% level. 
  
Company Name ψHOME,E ψNYSE,E TRP ψHOME,E ψNYSE,E TRP
America Movil 1 -0.9961 -1.0019 0.2869 -0.6906 0.7065 1 -0.9943 -1.0020 0.1765 -0.7090 0.8006
Grupo Aeroportuario del Sureste 1 -1.0061 -0.9961 0.4787 -0.5078 0.5148 1 -0.9973 -1.0011 0.6800 -0.2089 0.2350
Cemex 1 -1.0039 -0.9989 0.6997 -0.2852 0.2896 1 -0.9985 -0.9996 0.3548 -0.5883 0.6238
Fomento Economico Miexicano 1 -0.9994 -1.0004 0.2725 -0.7150 0.7241 1 -0.9963 -1.0018 0.2267 -0.7199 0.7605
Grupo Simec 1 -0.9987 -1.0024 0.1562 -0.8395 0.8431 1 -0.9956 -1.0042 0.2690 -0.7375 0.7327
Desarrolladora Homex 1 -0.9986 -1.0015 0.5517 -0.4242 0.4347 1 -0.9996 -1.0010 0.5275 -0.3624 0.4072
Industrias Bachoco 1 -0.9718 -1.0108 0.4268 -0.5921 0.5811 1 -0.9873 -1.0020 0.4883 -0.5126 0.5122
Empresas ICA 1 -0.9982 -1.0019 0.1047 -0.8923 0.8950 1 -0.9978 -1.0015 0.1301 -0.8590 0.8685
Coca Cola Femsa 1 -0.9988 -1.0011 0.5365 -0.4634 0.4634 1 -0.9933 -1.0049 0.6724 -0.3303 0.3294
Grupo Aeroportuario del Pacifico 1 -0.9989 -1.0012 0.3446 -0.6567 0.6558 1 -1.0048 -0.9983 0.5372 -0.3737 0.4102
Averages 1 -0.9971 -1.0016 0.3858 -0.6067 0.6108 1 -0.9965 -1.0016 0.4063 -0.5401 0.5680
Medians 1 -0.9988 -1.0013 0.3857 -0.6244 0.6185 1 -0.9968 -1.0016 0.4215 -0.5504 0.5680
             Cointegrating Vector Cointegrating Vector







Summary Statistics for the NYSE Translation Risk Percentage 
 
This table reports means, standard deviations (sd), interquartile ranges (iqr), and quartile 
results for TRPs for the sample of cross-listings from Canada, Brazil, and Mexico. TRP 
equals the burden of New York prices to adjust to exchange rate shocks expressed as a 
percent of the total burden of the NYSE and home market burdens. Results are presented 
separately for the period of low exchange rate volatility (January 1, 2008 – September 14, 




Country Period Mean Median min p25 p75 max iqr sd N
Canada Low 0.5942 0.6939 0.0657 0.3491 0.8608 0.9081 0.5117 0.2727 23
Canada High 0.6193 0.7100 0.1186 0.2459 0.8979 1.0000 0.6520 0.3158 23
Brazil Low 0.4394 0.4353 0.2475 0.3928 0.4727 0.6633 0.0799 0.1080 13
Brazil High 0.4551 0.5052 0.0000 0.2239 0.6130 0.7892 0.3890 0.2362 13
Mexico Low 0.6108 0.6185 0.2896 0.4634 0.7241 0.8950 0.2606 0.1900 10
Mexico High 0.5680 0.5680 0.2350 0.4072 0.7605 0.8685 0.3533 0.2194 10
All Countries Low 0.5540 0.5278 0.0657 0.3928 0.7241 0.9081 0.3313 0.2281 46







TRP Quintile Summary Statistics 
 
This table reports averages for quintile portfolios formed based on TRPs, defined as the 
NYSE share of the exchange rate burden. Quintile 1 consists of the lowest TRP quintile, 
and quintile 5 consists of the largest TRP quintile. NYSE % Volume of Total Vol is 
trading volume expressed in USD on the NYSE divided by the USD denominated trading 
volume on both the NYSE and the home exchange. The Cost Ratio equals the percentage 
quote spread on the home exchange divided by the percentage quote spread on the 
NYSE. Size equals total assets in thousands USD. Emerging equals the percentage of the 
group consisting of emerging market stocks.  
 
 
Panel A. January 1, 2008 - September 14, 2008
NYSE % Cost
Group TRP of Total Vol Ratio Size  Emerging
1 0.24 0.40 2.23 14,313           0.33
2 0.42 0.40 1.30 6,532             0.78
3 0.52 0.38 1.40 8,735             0.70
4 0.72 0.28 1.05 126,132         0.44
5 0.88 0.16 0.93 104,508         0.22
Panel B. September 15, 2008 - December 31, 2008
NYSE % Cost 
Group TRP of Total Vol Ratio Size Emerging
1 0.16 0.49 1.71 13,175           0.56
2 0.37 0.50 1.30 61,064           0.44
3 0.60 0.42 1.17 27,129           0.80
4 0.78 0.31 0.89 95,196           0.56









This table reports results of cross-sectional regressions of TRP against trading volume, 
trading costs, and firm size. TRP equals the NYSE share of the exchange rate burden. 
VOL equals the dollar trading volume expressed in USD on the NYSE divided by the 
USD denominated trading volume on both the NYSE and the home exchange. COST 
equals the percentage quote spread on the home exchange divided by the percentage 
quote spread on the NYSE. Size equals total assets in thousands USD. D is a dummy 
variable equal to zero for TRPs derived from January 1, 2008 – September 14, 2008, and 






Intercept 0.7458 10.49 0.00
D 0.0738 0.75 0.46
Vol -0.4746 -3.05 0.00
Vol × D -0.1808 -0.83 0.41
Panel B. Cost
Estimate t-statistic p-value
Intercept 0.6313 11.79 0.00
D 0.0231 0.32 0.75
COST -0.0559 -1.94 0.06
COST × D -0.0229 -0.55 0.59
Panel C. Firm Size
Estimate t-statistic p-value
Intercept 0.1623 0.77 0.44
D -0.0408 -0.14 0.89
ln(SIZE) 0.0416 1.89 0.06








Panel A. The Canadian Dollar to U.S. Dollar Exchange Rate 
 
 
























Figure 1.1, continued 
 




Figure 1.1 plots midpoint of daily quotes for exchange rates 
relative to the U.S. dollar for the Canadian dollar, Brazilian 





Impulse Response Functions 
 
Panel A. IRFs derived from trading days spanning January 1, 2008 – September 12, 2008
 
Figure 1.2 show impulse response functions (IRFs) are presented for three stocks in each 
market. Each IRF illustrates the response of each price series to a 1-time, 1-unit increase 
to the home currency to U.S. dollar exchange rate (i.e., an appreciation of the U.S. dollar 
relative to the home currency). Each IRF extends 500 steps ahead. Each step represents 1 
minute. The left side panel presents IRFs for stocks with the smallest translation risk 
percentage (TRP) within Brazil, Mexico, and Canada, respectively. The middle panel 
presents IRFs for stocks with the median TRP within each market.  The right side panel 
presents IRFs for stocks with the largest TRP within each market. TRP equals the burden 
of the NYSE price to adjust to changes in exchange rates, relative to the combined 












Plot of  versus   
 
 
       All Firms Low Volatility Period                  All Firms High Volatility Period 
                      
 
 
       Canada Low Volatility Period         Canada High Volatility Period 










Figure 1.3, continued 
 
       Brazil Low Volatility Period                    Brazil High Volatility Period 
                       
 
 
     
 Mexico Low Volatility Period                      Mexico High Volatility Period 
                      
 
Figure 1.3 plots ,ˆHOME E versus ,ˆNYSE E , which are the permanent impulse 
response estimates for the home exchange price and the NYSE price, 
respectively, to a 1-unit shock in the home currency to U.S. dollar exchange 
rate. ,ˆHOME E is graphed on the Y-axis and ,ˆNYSE E is graphed on the X-axis. 
The low exchange rate volatility period (Low Volatility Period) spans all 
trading days in January 1, 2008 – September 14, 2008. The high exchange 
rate volatility period (High Volatility Period) spans all trading days in 
September 15, 2008 – December 31, 2008. September 15, 2008 is the date 
of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy declaration and the beginning of 







Combined Markets Burden to Adjust to Exchange Rates  
 
 
Figure 1.4 plots the paired coordinates for the combined markets’ burdens to adjust 
to exchange rates for the sampled 46 cross-listings. The combined burden equals the 
sum of ,ˆHOME E plus ,ˆNYSE E . Paired coordinates are graphed for the combined burden 
during the low exchange rate volatility period (January 1, 2008 – September 14, 
2008) on the Y-axis versus the combined burden during the high exchange rate 
volatility period (September 15, 2008 – December 31, 2008) on the X-axis. Points 
lying below the 45 degree line correspond to firms that experienced an increase in 
the burden of their prices to adjust to exchange rates during the high volatility period 






















MARKET DOMINANCE AND PRICE DISCOVERY 
 
One of the most basic principles of finance asserts that asset prices depend on market 
characteristics that affect demand and supply. In the finance literature, price discovery 
refers to the study of how prices are formed through the interactions of demand and 
supply characteristics in specific markets.
12
 For example, many academic studies 
examine stocks that trade in multiple markets to identify the market that contributes the 
most to price discovery. And, more importantly, studies of cross-listings examine 
competing characteristics of the home versus foreign markets to identify key 
determinants of price discovery.   
 Studies of cross-listed stocks show that the home market dominates the price 
discovery process. Hypotheses have been offered to explain why the home market 
contributes the most to the price discovery process. One argument is that the home 
investors have an informational advantage so that price discovery is linked to the 
proximity of information to the country exchange – a sort of trickle-down effect of 
information first to the home market and then to the competing markets. An alternative 
                                                 
12
 Price discovery is considered important enough to be hailed the “hallmark” feature of the NYSE's 
centralized auction market by then CEO John Thain in a 2005 speech (Japan Society, September 2005). 
Also, in his May 18, 2005 written testimony to the U.S. Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs 
Committee Hearing on Regulation NMS (Regulation National Market System), Mr. Thain commented on 
the importance of the NYSE price discovery mechanism that: “offers superior market quality, and day after 
day demonstrates its ability to out-perform purely electronic exchanges during opens and closes, order 
imbalances and unforeseen, outside events” and that “creates the best prices on 89% of all trades compared 




argument is that price discovery is related to trading and volume advantages of the home 
market.   
 Despite the growing interest in price discovery for cross-listed stocks, conclusions 
reached by most studies are limited. First, existing studies examine data limited to home 
markets that maintain trading volume and cost advantages over competing markets. 
Therefore, price discovery conclusions that home investors have an informational 
advantage may merely be a manifestation of the dominance of home market 
characteristics. Second, studies of price discovery for cross-listings characterize markets 
solely on trading volume and cost. Effects of the price impacts of trades and exchange 
rates are ignored. Third, price discovery tests have been limited to predominantly stable 
market periods. Effects on price discovery during volatile market periods are unknown. 
 An objective of this study is to examine home markets that do not always 
maintain trading cost and volume advantages over competing markets. For this purpose, I 
examine cross-listings (ADRs) from Brazil and Mexico. For comparison purposes, I also 
examine Canadian cross-listings. I show that the degree of dominance in market 
characteristics differs distinctly across the three country exchanges. In contrast to existing 
literature, I find that the home market is not always the price discovery leader.  
 A second objective of this study is to broaden the scope of variables used to 
characterize markets, beyond trading volume and cost characteristics. For this purpose, I 
introduce two new variables into the price discovery literature: the relative burden of 
prices for each stock to adjust to exchange rate shocks, and differences in market depth 
for each stock. I show that both variables significantly affect price discovery and 




 A third objective of this study is to examine price discovery during a market crisis 
period. For this purpose, I choose the financial crisis that initiated in 2008. Specifically, I 
conduct price discovery tests for the 4-month period May 2008 – August 2008 and for the 
4-month period September 2008 – December 2008. I select equivalent 4-month periods 
delineated by the September 2008 bankruptcy announcement by Lehman Brothers. A 
chronology of the major financial events of 2008 is provided in Appendix 2.A. My tests 
point to several significant changes in price discovery between the two periods. 
 The rest of this study is organized as follows. The relevant literature is reviewed 
in Section 1. Institutional details for the stock markets in Canada, Brazil, and Mexico are 
discussed in Section 2. The details of the data and methodology are presented in Section 
3. Testable propositions are presented in Section 4. Results are presented and discussed in 
Section 5. Summarizing and concluding remarks are offered in Section 6. 
2.1.  Related Cross-Listing and Equity Price Discovery Literature 
Cross-listings are instruments for foreign firms to list their stock outside their home 
countries.
13
 Brazilian and Mexican stocks trade in the U.S. via indirect cross-listings as 
American Depository Receipts (ADRs), whereas Canadian stocks trade in the U.S. as 
direct cross-listings (ordinary share cross-listings).
14
 
                                                 
13
 According to NYSE/Euronext, advantages of cross-listing include ease in raising capital, increasing 
liquidity, improving visibility, building community, and rendering an IPO showcase. According to the 
Bank of New York Melon, depository receipts can “broaden and diversify the issuer's shareholder base 
with potentially greater liquidity, benefit share valuations and convey a global commitment.” See 
https://europeanequities.nyx.com/en/listings and http://www.bnymellon.com/depositaryreceipts/index.html, 
respectively. Many academic studies focus on these same issues. For example, Baker et al. (1998) show 
that foreign firms cross-list to gain access to U.S. investors and to improve investor awareness of the firm. 
For their sample of London-NYSE cross-listings, the authors find that analyst coverage and media attention 
increases, and the cost of equity capital falls. 
14
 ADRs were established by JP Morgan in 1927 as a way for U.S. investors to make foreign investments. 
Note that most firms cross-list in the U.S. via ADRs, which originate from many countries. In contrast, 
direct cross-listings (not via ADRs) are mostly limited to Canadian and Israeli stocks. To list as an ordinary 




Levine and Schmukler (2003) and Gozzi et al. (2005) report how international 
cross-listing boosts the total trading of international firms and assists the growth efforts 
of the firm after internationalizing its trading. In addition, the authors show that most of 
the increased trading activity occurs, not in the home market, but in the foreign markets. 
Therefore, their research indicates that firms that cross-list internationally experience 
significantly higher trading volume and that the lion’s share of the new trading volume 
occurs internationally. 
As multiple markets compete for order flow, traders (or trade orders) should 
migrate towards the exchange with the lowest transactions costs, all else equal. As argued 
by Aggarwal et al. (2007), as order flow migrates toward an exchange, informed traders 
wanting to “camouflage” their private information also will migrate toward the exchange. 
Therefore, price discovery should migrate towards the lower cost exchange where 
informed traders initiate. 
 Early studies focused on prices of stocks trading on multiple national and regional 
exchanges. In one of the early studies, Garbade and Silber (1979) find that regional 
exchanges contribute to price discovery by offering information that is “relevant for 
NYSE traders” (page 460). Consistent with Garbade and Silber’s findings, Mclnish and 
Wood (1992) show that regional exchanges offer competition to the NYSE, forcing 
tighter bid-ask spreads on the NYSE, and contributing to the price discovery process.   
Schreiber and Schwartz (1985) describe price discovery as the adjustment of 
prices toward changing equilibrium values. Deviations of actual prices from equilibrium 
prices are pricing errors, and lead to use of error correction modeling. In a landmark 
                                                                                                                                                 





paper, Harris et al. (1995) use error correction models to examine the NYSE and regional 
exchange listings of IBM and conclude that regional exchanges and the NYSE contribute 
to the price discovery process for IBM. Therefore, their findings indicate that the NYSE 
is not the sole source for price discovery. Specifically, the authors apply Gonzalo – 
Granger (1995) permanent/transitory (PT) decomposition tests on error correction models 
to estimate burdens of price adjustment on each exchange. The exchange with the larger 
price adjustment burden is the subordinate or “satellite” exchange. 
Hasbrouck (1995) also examines price discovery using an error correction model 
as his starting point. In contrast to Harris et al. (1995, 2002), however, Hasbrouck derives 
“information shares” for each firm for each exchange equal to the proportion of the 
implicit equilibrium price variance attributable to the exchange. Hasbrouck studies the 30 
Dow Jones Industrial Average stocks over the 3-month period August – October 1993, 
and finds that the bulk of price discovery takes place on the NYSE. Later, Harris et al. 
(2002) apply Gonzalo – Granger decomposition tests for significance of vector error 
correction model adjustment factors for the 30 Dow Jones Industrial Average stocks. The 
permanent component is associated with long-run prices and is the key focus of their 
price discovery tests. They find that the dominance of the NYSE weakened over the 1988 
– 1995 period.
15
 The Hasbrouck method often is referred to as the information share or IS 
method. The Harris et al. method often is referred to as permanent/transitory or PT 
                                                 
15
 Baillie et al. (2002) runs simulations comparing the results of the information share method to the 
Gonzalo-Granger PT method, emphasizing that differences exist if random errors in the error correction 
model are contemporaneously correlated across exchanges. Differences in the results are larger for lower 
frequency trading intervals (e.g., more than 1 minute). Hasbrouck (2002) also offers simulations comparing 
the Gonzalo-Granger PT and Hasbrouck IS methods, and shows that the minimum and maximum IS 
bounds contain the true value, whereas this may not be said of the Gonzalo-Granger PT method.  de Jong 
(2002) points out that both methods have merit, but that only the IS method takes the variance of the price 
innovations into consideration. Also, see Lehmann (2002) for a summary and discussion of a special issue 
of the Journal of Financial Markets, on which Lehmann served as editor, devoted to the study of price 








 Studies of price discovery for international cross-listings include Werner and 
Kleidon (1996), who examine the two hour contemporaneous overlap in intraday prices 
for U.K. stocks cross-listing on the NYSE or AMEX.
17
 The authors document that 
trading volume clusters on both exchanges and bid-ask spreads fall in London during the 
two hour overlap, and attribute the clustering to the incorporation of private information. 
The authors conclude (page 658) that exchanges in both countries leave distinct 
“footprints in the data.”  
 Eun and Sabherwal (2003) explore international cross-listings from Canada to the 
U.S. Using Gonzalo-Granger error correction methods, the authors find that, on average, 
the home market (TSE) retains 62% market share of price discovery.
18
 One possible 
implication is that informational advantages associated with the home market have a 
stronger effect than any size, liquidity, and investor recognition advantages associated 
with the U.S. market. The authors point out that the TSE is very competitive with the 
U.S. exchanges and report that the TSE retains a median value of 56% of trades. 
Therefore, their results support the proposition that price discovery should take place 
                                                 
16
 Huang and Locke (2008) examine price discovery across CME S&P500 futures floor traders, and find 
that more active traders (higher volume traders) dominate the futures price discovery process. Interestingly, 
and related to the present study, the authors find that price leadership by the more active group increases 
when the market becomes more bearish and volatile. Their study provides a stepping stone for the 
investigation of price discovery dynamics pre and post the market turmoil period in 2008, delineated by the 
watershed Lehman Brothers bankruptcy declaration. 
17
 Froot and Dabora (1999) examine rate of return differentials of “Siamese twin” companies  that pool 
their cash flows, and trade around the world. The authors examine three twin companies:  Royal Dutch 
Petroleum and Shell Transport and Trading, PLC; Unilever N.V. and Unilever PLC; and SmithKline 
Beecham. Their tests indicate that the relative price of twin stocks correlate highly with the relative stock-
market indexes of the countries where the stocks of the twin companies most actively trade. Their results 
indicate that prices depend heavily on the location where the most active trading occurs. 
 
18 Ding et al. (1999) apply Gonzalo and Granger  methods to examine cross-listings from Malaysia to 




mostly in the home market (also see Bacidore and Sofianos (2002), and Solnik (1996)). 
Their findings also show that price discovery may be driven by trading volume, 
especially by the trading of informed investors, which is consistent with the arguments 
and findings of Hasbrouck (1995) for the U.S. exchanges. 
 Many studies suggest that the advantages of trading on the NYSE versus an 
emerging market are substantial enough to lead to order flow migration, in which most of 
the trading migrates to the NYSE (Moel (2001)). Halling et al. (2007) shows that the 
trading volume migrates to the U.S. especially for cross-listings from countries located 
close to the U.S. and that are characterized by low financial development and poor insider 
trading protection. Since price discovery is strongly affected by the proportion of trading 
activity that takes place across the competing markets, a logical question is to ask 
whether the price discovery process migrates along with order flow. And if so, are 
emerging markets on the brink of extinction?
19
 
Often, existing literature limit the analysis to two markets with similar 
characteristics, such that the relative disadvantages of trading in the home-market as 
opposed to the international market are slight. But not all markets are twins. Very little is 
understood about the price discovery process when stocks internationally cross-list and 
the two exchanges differ along multiple dimensions. My study addresses this void in the 
literature. 
2.2. Stock Trading Details for Canada, Brazil, and Mexico 
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 Current chairman of the Swiss Futures and Options Association, Otto Nägeli, expressed similar opinions, 
quoted in a Financial Times article (Hall, 1997): “Sometimes I have the impression that national stock 
exchanges are regarded like national airlines. A country needs one to prove its autonomy. That is no longer 
valid. There are no boundaries any more except in our minds.” Also, see Angel (1998) for an excellent 





The number of cross-listings of non-U.S. firms on U.S. stock exchanges has soared over 
the past decade. For example, at the end of 2000, there were 420 foreign firm cross-
listings on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), but by the end of the decade the 
number of cross-listings more than tripled to 1280. Cross-listings offer the opportunity to 
own foreign securities through a mechanism that affords the advantages normally 
associated with ownership of securities of domestic U.S. issuers. The growing popularity 
of cross-listing use is commonly attributed to an increased appetite of U.S. investors to 
diversify internationally. 
 Not only have cross-listings risen dramatically, but the composition of U.S. cross-
listings by home country also has changed dramatically over the past two decades. For 
example, the number of participating countries more than doubled from 30 to 76 since 
1990, mostly attributable to emerging market participation. During the intervening 
period, emerging markets have undergone highly publicized market liberalizations, 
opening doors to foreign investors for the first time. As further evidence of the growing 
participation of non-conventional market cross-listings, at the beginning of 1990, U.K., 
Australia, and Japan constituted 65% of all listings, but by 2003 comprised only 33% of 
all listings.  
Among the emerging markets, Latin American cross-listings have grown 
significantly. For example, Latin America constituted 10% of all cross-listings in 1990, 
but over 20% by 2000. Latin America is not the only region tilting the composition of 
U.S. cross-listings towards emerging markets. Christopher Sturdy, executive vice 





 “Exceptional activity from DR investors and issuers occurred in 
every region of the world this [2007] past year. In particular, we 
witnessed impressive growth in emerging markets, especially from 
‘BRIC’ countries of Brazil, Russia, India, and China.”  
In fact, by March 30, 2008, an industry-wide record 2,093 sponsored Depository Receipt 
programs, with an estimated asset value of $1.8 trillion, were available.
20
 At the same 
time, non-U.S. equities accounted for 22.7% of all equity investment in the United States.  
 I select Canada as one of the international markets for several reasons: no other 
country has as many cross-listings on the NYSE as Canada, the Toronto Stock Exchange 
(TSE) opens and closes at the same times of day as the NYSE, and U.S. and Canada 
share a common geographic border with significant cross-country economic trade. 
Canadian stocks traded in the U.S. as ordinary shares. Therefore, a study of minute-by 
minute prices quotes and trading volume during 2008 for Canadian cross-listings will 
offer keen insights into the effects of price discovery between two closely linked 
developed markets during a time of escalating economic turmoil.  
 Trading on the TSE is done electronically, and market makers serve central roles 
similar to NYSE specialists. As explained by Smith et al. (2001) and Eun and Sabherwal 
(2002a and 2002b), TSE subscribers have access to the order book, including price and 
the aggregate size of orders at the market, and at either side of the market bid and ask 
prices. Trading on the TSE is regulated by the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC). 
The tick size on TSE stocks is $CAN 0.01.
21
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 The Mexican market is of particular interest because it is an important emerging 
market, its stock exchange (the Bolsa Mexicana de Valores, or BMV) shares the same 
trading hours as the NYSE, it shares a common border with the U.S., and most of its 
exports are sent to the U.S. For example, in 2008 (the year of my study), 80.51% of the 
Mexican exports went to the U.S., and 49.2% of the Mexican imports came from the U.S. 
(from the Secretaria de Economia).  
 On the BMV, shares can be issued under different series; primarily series A, B, C,  
L, and O shares. Series A shares are restricted to Mexican nationals, but can be acquired 
indirectly by foreigners via ADRs or hedge funds. Series B shares are unrestricted as to 
the domicile of the investor. Series C shares can be owned by foreigners, but carry 
limited voting rights, and are constrained to be within stated limits of total capital of the 
issuing firm.  Series L shares can be owned by foreigners, but have limited or no voting 
rights. Series O shares are ordinary shares of financial firms, and carry full voting rights.  
 Trades on the BMV are done electronically and are processed through the BMV 
SENTRA Capitales electronic system (Electronic System for Negotiation, Transaction, 
Registry and Allocation). The SENTRA Capitales system is administered by the BMV 
for the trading and negotiation of securities in the stock market, provides real-time 
information with complete access to the order book, and “identifies the best alternatives 
for the investors and allows a direct participation in the markets.”
22
 Trading on the BMV 
is regulated by the Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores (CNBV), the Banco de 
México (Banxico), and the Secretaria de Hacienda y Crédito Público (SHCP, also known 
as the Hacienda). The tick size for stocks trading on the BMV is MXN 0.01.   
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 The Brazilian market is of special interest as one of the fastest growing emerging 
markets. Its real GDP growth averaged 3.64% during 2001 - 2010, and Brazil was 
awarded investment grade status in April 2008. For comparison, during 2001 – 2010, real 
GDP growth averaged 1.89% in Canada, 1.66% in Mexico, and 1.58% in the U.S. (IMF 
World Economic Outlook, April 2012).  
 The São Paulo Stock Exchange (Bolsa de Valores de São Paulo, or BOVESPA) 
trading hours include a 15-minute pre-opening period from 9:45AM – 10AM BRT (BRT 
is the time zone abbreviation for “Brazil Time”). The market then runs from 10AM 
through 5PM BRT. Sao Paulo is one hour ahead of the New York for most of the year. 




 The  Brazilian Mercantile and Futures Exchange merged with BOVESPA in 
2008, forming BM&FBOVESPA. For simplicity, I will refer to the stock exchange as 
BOVESPA. Trades on the BOVESPA are done electronically, and are processed through 
the MEGA BOLSA electronic trading system. The MEGA BOLSA system promotes 
“fairness and transparency, allowing brokerage houses and vendors to view all orders in 
real time, via private networks.”
24
 Stock trading on the BOVESPA is regulated by the 
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 Adjustments were made for different Daylight Savings Time dates for all markets. For instance, for 
Mexico City, 2008 DST began Sunday April 6 at 2AM CT, and ended Sunday October 26 at 2AM CT. For 
São Paulo, 2008 DST ended Saturday February 16 at midnight BRT, and began Saturday October 18 at 
midnight BRT. For most of the year, there is a full overlap of the BOVESPA with the 9:30AM – 4PM ET 
trading day on the NYSE. The pre-opening and opening 30 minutes on the BOVESPA are not used in my 
analysis because that time period does not overlap with NYSE trading times. For Toronto, 2008 DST began 
Sunday, March 3 at 2AM ET, and ended  November 2 at 2AM ET. For New York, 2008 DST began 
Sunday, March 9 at 2AM ET, and ended November 2 at 2AM ET. Both the BMV and TSE changed their 
opening and closing to match the NYSE throughout the year.   
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Comissao de Valores Mobiliarios (CVM) and the Banco Central do Brazil (BCB). The 
tick size for stocks trading on the BOVESPA is BRL 0.01.  
  Mexican and Brazilian stocks that cross-list in the U.S. trade as American 
Depository Receipts, or ADRs, which are certificates issued by a U.S. Bank (e.g., The 
Bank of New York Mellon is the ADR leader) representing shares of foreign companies, 
and are denominated in U.S. dollars. There are four ADRs levels. Level I Sponsored 
ADRs trade in the over-the-counter market (less regulation). Level II and III Sponsored 
ADRs trade on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ. Level II and III Sponsored ADRs are 
heavily regulated by the SEC, and listing fees for Level III Sponsored ADRs are higher 
than other ADRs. For Sponsored ADRs, the foreign firm has greater involvement in the 
issue, and investors have the same voting and dividend rights as the home market 
shareholders. The fourth type of ADRs are privately placed (SEC Rule 144A) ADRs that 
do not require registration with the SEC.  
 All ADRs (Mexico and Brazil) in my sample are Level II and III ADRs, which 
require registration with the SEC, and the filing of annual reports that fully comply with 
GAAP standards. To be registered with the SEC, the company must comply with high 
disclosure and transparency standards.
25
 The high disclosure standards facilitate the 
examination and oversight of the company by the SEC and investors, and place the ADRs 
on a more level playing field.  
 The three markets provide the largest number of cross-listings of any three 
markets, and the three markets span the continuum from developed market (Canada) to 
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 Level II ADRs are issued by companies wanting to cross-list in the U.S. Level II ADRs amount to the 
indirect purchase of already-existing shares. Level III ADRs are issued by companies wanting to cross-list 
and to raise capital via a public offering in the U.S. In contrast, Level I ADRs trade over-the-counter and 




emerging market (Mexico). While the three markets share significant intraday overlap, 
the geographic proximities of each market to New York differ substantially. All three 
markets are major economic trade partners with the U.S. For instance, as of 2010, the 
U.S. is the top economic trade partner with Canada and Mexico and is the second biggest 
trade partner with Brazil. Despite being classified as an emerging market, Brazil is 
among the fastest developing emerging markets (i.e., one of the BRICs), while still in the 
initial stages of incorporating free market characteristics. 
2.3. The Data and Methodology 
My sample includes 10 Mexican, 13 Brazilian, and 23 Canadian cross-listings for May 
2008 through December 2008. In order to estimate contributions to price discovery, I use 
tick-by-tick quote and price data from the Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-
Pacific (SIRCA) database. SIRCA receives the original data from Thomson-Reuters, and 
provides a full breadth of global intraday trade, quote, and market depth for stocks and 
other instruments. Thomson Reuters Tick History provides millisecond time-stamped 
data for over 35 million OTC exchange-traded instruments worldwide. Additional data 
used in the cross-sectional tests are derived from Datastream, Bloomberg, and I/B/E/S. 




I screen all quote data for errors in the same manner as Lockwood (2013) using the Billor 
et al. (2000) approach.
27 
To avoid the disproportionate loss of observations clustered 
                                                 
26
 It is common to filter microstructure data, as pointed out in many microstructure papers (see, for 
example, Kryzanoski and Zhang (2002) and Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996)).   
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 Obvious data errors (negative spreads, zero spreads, or outrageous spreads) are eliminated, after which I 
filter data (price quote and exchange rate) using the Billor et al. (2000) blocked adaptive computationally 




around significant volatility events, I applied the procedures in a univariate manner to 
each stock separately for each day. After filtering the data for errors, I form midpoint 
prices in order to estimate Hasbrouck’s (1995) information shares and each firm’s burden 
of adjustment to exchange rates. Intraday bid and ask exchange rate quotes are obtained 
from Olsen and Associates. 
  In order to form synchronous pricing series, I eliminate weekends and holidays 
scheduled on the NYSE and holidays scheduled on the home exchange. I exclude stocks 
that split during the sample period. As explained in Eun and Sabherwal (2003), stock 
splits in the HOME and NYSE exchanges can differ by several days, which would cause 
data synchronicity problems in my tests. I also drop the opening quote to eliminate 
overnight effects, and to ensure that the time series pertains to the continuous trading 
session only (also see Hasbrouck (1995) for similar arguments). 
2.3.B. Methodology 
To motivate the relative price discovery in the HOME market and the NYSE, I first 
provide the theoretical link between prices. For the moment, I ignore market 
microstructure issues and other considerations such as transaction cost and exchange-rate 
effects. I assume that both the HOME price-series 
,{ }HOME tP  and the NYSE price-series 
,{ }NYSE tP  are random walk plus noise processes. Also, ,{ }HOME tP  and ,{ }NYSE tP  are 
constructed to share the same stochastic trend tP . Intuitively, tP  is a pure random walk 
                                                                                                                                                 
particularly appropriate for large datasets. The BACON method begins by identifying a subset of the 
sample (called the “basic sample”) that is “safely” free of outliers. Then, the method iteratively expands on 
the basic sample by creating a new basic sample containing observations with acceptable Mahalonobis 
distances relative to the previous basic sample median (or mean). The acceptable distance is chosen using a 
percentile of the chi-square distribution. Billor et al. used the 95th percentile in their simulation. The 
iterations continue until the size of the basic sample stabilizes. Observations not included in the converged 




process that represents the implicit efficient price, relevant to computing the contributions 
to price discovery.  
 Formally, prices are assumed to evolve by the following processes:  
 , ,HOME t t HOME tP P     (2.1) 
 , ,NYSE t t NYSE tP P     (2.2) 
 1t t tP P w    (2.3) 
 where єHOME,t,  єNYSE,t,  wt  are independently distributed white-noise disturbances. A 
unique result stemming from the set-up outlined above is that subtracting the realized 
value of 
,NYSE tP  from the realized value of ,HOME tP  yields a stationary sequence: 
 , , , , , ,( ) ( )HOME t NYSE t t HOME t t NYSE t HOME t NYSE tP P P P            (2.4) 
 Using Engle and Granger’s terminology, premultiplying the 2 × 1 vector
, ,( , )t HOME t NYSE tp P P   by the 1 × 2 cointegrating vector ' (1, 1)    yields the stationary 
sequence
, ,HOME t NYSE t  . We should also expect the sequence , ,HOME t NYSE tP P 
, ,HOME t NYSE t   to have a mean around zero based on a simple arbitrage argument. 
Ignoring market frictions, 
, , 0HOME t NYSE tP P   implies an arbitrage opportunity and 
violates the law of one price. Arbitragers, or simple value shoppers, should keep the two 
prices from drifting far apart.  
 The dynamic model motivated by this discussion is an error correction model. 
Enders (2004) describes a vector error-correction (VEC) model as a vector autoregression 
(VAR) “augmented with an error term.” A simple error-correction model that can apply 




 , , 1 , 1 ,( )HOME t HOME HOME t NYSE t HOME tP P bP        (2.5) 
 , , 1 , 1 ,( )NYSE t NYSE HOME t NYSE t NYSE tP P bP        (2.6) 
 As specified, the prices respond to the previous period’s deviation from long-run 
equilibrium and stochastic shocks. For example, suppose that (PHOME,t-1 – bPNYSE,t-1) > 0, 
so that the equilibrium error is positive. In this case, the price at HOME will fall and the 
price on the NYSE will rise to restore the long-run equilibrium (assuming prices are 
mutually adjusting). The adjustment parameters HOME  and NYSE  measure the degree to 
which 
,HOME tP  and ,NYSE tP  respond to the previous periods deviation from long-run 
equilibrium. If both of the alpha coefficients are significant, then prices are mutually 
adjusting. If only one alpha is significant (e.g., NYSE ) then the NYSE bears all the burden 
of adjustment to restore long-run equilibrium. If neither of the alpha coefficients are 
significant then the error correction term drops out of the equation, so that the prices are 
not cointegrated. Nevertheless, the most important issue at hand is how the parameters of 
the VEC model are employed to measure the relative price discovery in the HOME 
market and the NYSE. 
 The information share method starts with a fully specified error-correction model 





t t s t s t
s
p c p p   

        (2.7) 
 where ∆pt is the 2 × 1 vector of prices, c is 2 × 1 vector of constants, α is the 2 × 1 vector 
of adjustment parameters, β’ is the 1 ×2 cointegrating vector, and єt is the 2 × 1 vector of 




is more general. The only difference, besides notation, is that a vector of constants, c,  
and  2 × 2 matrices of AR coefficients (denoted s ) have been added.   
 In order to define the Hasbrouck IS, Equation (2.7) must be expressed as a vector 
moving average (VMA) model. Employing the Wold Representation Theorem: 
 1 1 2 2 ( ) .t t t t tp L              (2.8) 
 Next, applying the Beveridge and Nelson (1981) decomposition to ( ) tL  and separating 









     (2.9) 
where 1 2(1) I       , and measures the long-run impact of a shock to the 
level of prices, and Ψ
*
 is a matrix polynomial. The value of the (1)  elements can be 
backed out of the parameterized VEC model Equation (2.7) by computing the impulse 
response functions. 
 In Hasbrouck’s framework, there is one cointegrating relationship and one 
underlying random walk process so that the rows in (1)  are identical. Defining ψ as a 












   (2.10) 
 where the ε are (2 × 1) vectors of random errors (εHOME , εNYSE)’, and ι is a (2 × 1) vector 










  is a permanent random walk component that is common to 




the proportion of variance of the price process attributable to each market. Formally, the 










  (2.11) 
 where [ψ C]j is the j
th
 element of the (1 × 2) row vector [ψ C] , ( )tVar   is the (2 × 2) 
variance-covariance matrix of the errors or “innovations”, and C is the (2 × 2) lower 
triangular matrix derived from a Cholesky decomposition of Ω (e.g., CCΩ  ).  
 Hasbrouck’s IS for market j depends on the ordering of the variables, and yields a 
lower and upper bound, depending on the repeated re-ordering of the variables. This 
result stems from the Cholesky decomposition of the variance-covariance matrix, Ω. 
Booth et al. (2002) suggest taking the midpoint of the upper and lower bounds of the IS 
solution to obtain a single measure for the IS of market j. Ballie et al. (2002) and 
Grammig and Peter (2013) point out that the distance between the upper and lower 
bounds can be rather wide, especially in the presence of contemporaneous correlation, 
blurring the IS interpretation.
28
 Hasbrouck (2003) suggests using higher frequency data to 
reduce the contemporaneous correlation, effectively tightening the spread between the 
upper and lower bounds. In other words, the upper and lower bound for Hasbrouck’s IS 
will be much wider for data sampled at 10 minute intervals compared to 1 minute 
intervals. In my study, I apply the Hasbrouck (midpoint IS) method on 1-minute data. 
2.3.C. Cross-Sectional Tests 
I analyze the determinants of price discovery using cross-sectional regressions. The 
dependent variable is the NYSE information share for each stock. I examine relations of 
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the NYSE information with variables that capture trading characteristics such as trading 
costs, trading volume, market depth, and exchange rate effects. I also include controls for 
company size, market-to-book equity ratio, and analyst recommendation dispersion.  All 
explanatory variables are defined below.  
2.3.C.i Trading Costs 
All else equal, investors will confine trading to the local exchange if transactions costs 
are lower on the local exchange. For each stock, relative trading cost is defined as the 
ratio of the percent bid-ask spread of the HOME exchange to the percent bid-ask spread 
on the NYSE exchange. The percent bid-ask spread is defined as: 
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  (2.12) 
where  Aski,X,t and Bidi,X,t are the exchange X ask and bid prices, respectively, for stock i 
as of the end of 1-minute interval t. For each 1-minute interval, I calculate the spread 
ratio, SR,  defined as the 1-minute percentage bid-ask quote spread for the HOME market 











   (2.13) 
 I hypothesize that price discovery takes place primarily on the market with the 
lower relative trading costs. I expect that the high cost exchange will bear larger burden 
to adjust prices, or, alternatively, that the low cost exchange will dominate the price 
discovery process. For example, assuming narrower spreads on the NYSE, the HOME 
market maker likely will feel compelled to respond to the NYSE prices. Therefore, I 




HOME market versus the NYSE) will induce a high price discovery contribution for the 
NYSE.   
2.3.C.ii.  Trading volume 
For each stock, I develop a relative trading volume percentage, defined as the USD value 
of shares traded on the NYSE divided by the USD value of shares traded on both 
exchanges. For each minute, volume equals the cumulative number of shares traded 
multiplied by the midpoint of the bid and ask prices as of the end of the minute. I define 
PVOLi,t  as the USD value of shares traded on the NYSE divided by the USD volume 
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  (2.14) 
I hypothesize that increased volume improves liquidity and should attract informed 
traders. Further, in attempts to attract trading volume, market makers on the lower 
volume exchange will likely be more motivated to adjust their bid-ask quotes in order to 
attract volume. In other words, the lower volume exchange likely has a greater burden to 
adjust prices, implying that the exchange with higher volume likely dominates the price 
discovery process. Therefore, I hypothesize that the sign on the slope coefficient will be 
positive, implying that higher relative volume on the NYSE should translate to higher 
price discovery on the NYSE. 
2.3.C.iii.  Market depth 
Market depth refers to the trading volume needed to move the stock price by a given 
amount, and measures the ability of the market to absorb trades without affecting market 




measures the extent to which stock prices change relative to the volume traded and is 
estimated as the slope coefficient in: 
 , , , , , , ,% i X t X i i X t i X tP Vol      (2.15) 
where, for stock i, transaction t, on exchange X, %∆Pi,X,t is the percent change in the 
stock price times 100, Voli,X,t is the number of shares traded (in multiples of 1,000 
shares), and 
, ,i X t  is a random error. While the price discovery analysis requires the use of 
quote data, here I use transaction prices to derive market depth measures. Generally 
speaking, Kyle’s Lambda is expected to be high for stocks with greater private 
information. For example, in the model developed by Kyle (1985), informed traders 
conceal private information by trading at rates inversely proportional to price impact.  
 For example, consider stock i with recent price of $100 and ,NYSE i  of 0.05. For 
this stock trading on the NYSE, a 1,000 share trade is associated with a 0.05 percent 
change in the price to $100.05 (for a buy order) or to $99.95 (for a sell order). A steeper 
slope implies lower depth and reflects a larger price impact for a given trade volume.  
 For each stock, I calculate the difference in market depth for the two exchanges,
, ,i HOME i NYSE  . Therefore, a positive 0.01 difference implies that the HOME prices 
changed 0.01% more than NYSE prices, for the same stock, after controlling for trading 
volume. A positive difference indicates that the HOME market has less depth relative to 
the NYSE. Therefore, I expect that the NYSE information share will be positively related 
to the depth difference variable; i.e., that price discovery is higher on the deeper 
exchange.  




Based on a 3-system vector error correction model on 1-minute data, I derive long-run 
impacts of a shock to the exchange rate on prices on the HOME market and the NYSE, 
respectively. For each stock, I create a translation risk percentage (TRP) equal to:  
 
, ,













  (2.16) 
 where, for stock i, 
, ,i NYSE E  ( , ,i HOME E ) measures the burden of the NYSE (HOME) price 
to adjust to exchange rates. E is the HOME currency price of $1 U.S. dollar (e.g., E 
increases as the U.S. dollar strengthens relative to the HOME currency, or, alternatively, 
as the HOME currency depreciates relative to the U.S. dollar). Details of the psi 
estimation for Equation (2.19) are provided in Lockwood (2013).
29
  
 Either the price of the stock on the HOME exchange, ,HOME tP , must respond (as 
measured by , ,i HOME E ) to the exchange rate shock, or the price of the cross-listing on the 
NYSE, ,NYSE tP , must respond (as measured by , ,i NYSE E ) to the exchange rate shock, or 
both series must respond. The sum of both parameters (in absolute value) can be 
interpreted as the combined total response to an exchange rate shock. Therefore, TRP 
equals the NYSE’s percent share of the adjustment to exchange rate shocks. If responses 
to an exchange rate shock are symmetric then TRP will equal 50 percent. I expect the 
NYSE information share is negatively related to the TRP variable; i.e., the NYSE 
information share is higher (lower) if the NYSE bears a lower (higher) burden to adjust to 
exchange rates. 
2.3.C.v.  Control Variables 
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 Also, see Grammig et al. (2005) and Frijns et al. (2010) for treatments of exchange rate effects in 




I include the following control variables: firm size, market-to-book equity, analyst 
recommendation dispersion, and a financial industry dummy variable. I discuss expected 
relations of the NYSE information share with each variable below, and offer information-
related explanations for each relation. Predictions explained below for the control 
variables assume that informed trades occur mostly on the HOME market.  
 Information is generally more obscure for smaller firms. I conjecture that 
informed trades have a larger price discovery impact for small firms than for large firms. 
For instance, consider a failed Phase III clinical trial drug test for a small Mexican 
pharmaceutical. The announcement is likely to have a larger stock price impact on the 
small Mexican firm versus a large Mexican firm that is more able to absorb the bad news. 
For each firm, I calculate firm size equal to the natural logarithm of total assets, obtained 
quarterly from BLOOMBERG. I hypothesize that the NYSE information share will be 
positively related to firm size.   
 Fama and French (1993), Lakonishok et al. (1994), and others show that stocks 
with high market equity to book equity ratios tend to have high growth rates in sales, 
earnings, and cash flow. I expect that private information has a greater effect on prices 
for growth firms versus non-growth firms because less is known about growth firms. For 
growth firms, most of the stock price reflects a high present value of uncertain future 
growth opportunities. The market-to-book data are obtained monthly from 
DATASTREAM . I hypothesize that the NYSE information share will be negatively 
related to the market-to-book ratio.  
 Analyst recommendation dispersion is assumed to be positively related to the 




information uncertainty (see Miller (1977), Diether et al. (2002) and Johnson (2004)). I 
derive analyst recommendation dispersion from I/B/E/S, which, for each stock for each 
month, equals the cross-sectional standard deviation across U.S. analyst 
recommendations (1 = strong sell, 5 = strong buy). I hypothesize that the NYSE 
information share will be negatively related to analyst recommendation dispersion. 
 I include the financial industry dummy variable because, presumably, information 
for financial firms intensified during 2008. Financial stocks were hit the hardest during 
the 2008 crisis. For example, returns for the S&P500 versus the financial sector  SPDR 
(XLF) were -6.4% versus -18.7% over May 1, 2008 – August 31, 2008 and -29% versus -
40.1% over September 1, 2008 – December 2008. As explained in Appendix 2.A, key 
economic events during the latter part of 2008 focused on plummeting financial market 
casualties such as Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Merrill 
Lynch, AIG, Washington Mutual, and Wachovia.  
 To control for financial industry effects, I include a dummy variable equal to one 
for all financial stocks, zero otherwise. I caution the reader that all of the financial stocks 
in my sample are Canadian stocks. Therefore, the slope on the financial industry dummy 
variable in my simple linear regressions may capture a combined effect of the financial 
industry and Canadian versus emerging markets effect. A more relevant measure of the 
financial industry effect is provided by the multiple linear regressions, which control for 
many cross-sectional differences in Canadian versus emerging market stock 
characteristics. I expect that the NYSE information share is negatively related to the 
financial industry dummy variable. 




2.4.A. Market Dominance Proposition 
I examine a market dominance proposition in which price discovery migrates to the 
market that provides the best trading venue in terms of volume, bid-ask spreads, market 
depth, and insensitivity to exchange rates. The market dominance proposition is 
supported if the cross-sectional variation in NYSE information shares is positively related 
to the trading cost and volume variables defined in Equations (2.16) and (2.17), and 
negatively related to the price impact and translation risk percentage variables defined in 
Equations (2.18) and (2.19). A rejection of the market dominance proposition implies that 
price discovery occurs mainly on the home exchange, regardless of trading characteristics 
(e.g., insignificant relations between the NYSE information share and the trading 
characteristic variables). For example, informational advantages might be associated with 
the proximity of the company headquarters to the stock exchange, implying that  
company-specific information is available first to the home market, and then to 
competing markets. In this case, prices tend to move first in the home market followed by 
prices in competing markets, regardless of volume, cost, depth, or exchange rate burdens 
between the NYSE and HOME markets.  
2.4.B. NYSE Price Discovery Crisis Proposition 
I also examine the proposition that price discovery migrates toward the NYSE in the 
financial crisis period. Price discovery might migrate toward the NYSE because a greater 
amount of relevant macroeconomic information was being produced in New York during 
the crisis due to extraordinary policy decisions being implemented by U.S. government 
authorities such as the Fed and the SEC. Alternatively, a rejection of the NYSE price 




market in the crisis period. For example, price discovery might migrate toward the 
HOME market if foreign investors reduce their overseas activity during financial crises. 
The crisis proposition is tested by examining the changes in the NYSE information shares 
between the pre-crisis and crisis periods. 
2.4.C. Market Depth Proposition 
Many studies focus on measuring the liquidity of a particular market or a specific firm. 
Much of the early work focused solely on bid-ask spreads to draw conclusions regarding 
the liquidity of a firm. The basic argument is that wider bid-ask spreads imply lower 
liquidity. Although liquidity is closely tied to bid-ask spreads, Lee, Mucklow, and Ready 
(1993) emphasize the importance of including a quantity dimension, or depth 
measurement, to the price dimension of the spread. Corwin (1999) adds support to this 
argument, showing that depth differs significantly across firms listed on the NYSE. 
Taken together, these studies support the argument that inferences regarding liquidity, 
based solely on the tightness of the spread, can be very misleading - particularly when 
correlation between spreads and depth are low or negative.
30
 
 Therefore, market depth measures important effects that volume and cost may fail 
to capture. For instance, a stock might have a narrower spread on one exchange, but the 
volume offered at the bid and ask might be smaller than the competing exchange that 
otherwise has wider spreads. Larger purchase orders may have to be parceled at 
increasingly higher ask prices, effectively lessening the dominance of the lower cost 
exchange. I find that the number of occasions in which an exchange dominates on cost 
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 To my knowledge, no price discovery study of cross-listings incorporates a depth variable. I am indebted 
to University of South Carolina Professor Steve Mann for suggesting the inclusion of market depth in my 




and/or volume, but not on depth is substantial (this issue is discussed in detail in the 
Results section).  
 I examine the proposition that price discovery is greater on the market with 
greater depth. The proposition can be extended to a multivariate framework, after 
controlling for traditional variables such as trading cost and volume. In the latter case, the 
proposition states that price discovery is related to market depth even after controlling for 
trading cost and volume (e.g., significant relation between NYSE information shares and 






2.4.D. Exchange Rate Burden Proposition 
The exchange rate burden measures the degree to which prices adjust to exchange rates. 
My TRP variable measures the percent of the combined markets burdens to adjust to 
exchange rates borne by the NYSE. A high TRP indicates that New York prices bear 
most of the exchange rate burden.   
 Under the exchange rate proposition, price discovery is greater on the market with 
lower burden to adjust to exchange rates (e.g., the NYSE information share is negatively 
related to TRP). As with the market depth proposition, the exchange rate burden 
proposition can be extended after controlling for traditional trading characteristics, in 
which case the proposition states that price discovery is affected by the burden to adjust 
to exchange rates regardless of other trading characteristic advantages.  
2.5.  Results 
Listings of the companies are provided in Tables 2.1 through 2.3, for Canada, Brazil, and 
Mexico, respectively. Descriptive statistics for all the variables are reported in Table 2.4. 
Results are reported separately for the pre-crisis period May 1, 2008 through August 31, 
2008 and for the crisis period September 1, 2008 – December 31, 2008. The periods are 
delineated by the September 2008 bankruptcy declaration by Lehman Brothers. A graph 
of the 2008 VIX (Figure 2.1) shows that market volatility began spiking in September, 
approximately doubling in the month of September from 23.06 to 45.14. Prior to 
September, the VIX was fairly stable. I refer to the 4-month period May 1, 2008 – August 
31, 2008 as the “pre-crisis period,” and to the 4-month period from September 1, 2008 – 





2.5.A.  Stock Characteristics Results 
Percentiles for the stock characteristics are presented in Table 2.4, Panels B though H for 
relative cost, relative trading volume, depth difference, translation risk percentage, firm 
size, market-to-book value, and recommendation dispersion, respectively. Relative costs, 
trading volume, market depth, and translation risk percentage are used to identify the 
primary exchange for each set of cross-listings. The data show that the TSE is the 
primary exchange for most Canadian stocks. The median relative cost is less than one 
(cost is less on the TSE), the median relative trading volume is less than 50% (less than 
half of the trading volume is executed on the NYSE), and median depth difference is 
negative (the TSE is the deeper exchange).  
 In contrast, the emerging markets are often not the primary exchange. For 
example, the median relative cost exceeds one for both Brazil and Mexico (cost is higher 
on the BOVESPA and BOLSA, versus the NYSE), the median relative trading volume 
exceeds 50% for Mexican stocks (more than 50% of trading in Mexican stocks execute 
on the NYSE).
31
 The median depth difference for Mexico is positive (the NYSE is deeper 
than the BOLSA) in the pre-crisis period. The relative cost, trading volume, and market 
depth data show that the dominance of the home exchange follows a continuum from the 
Canadian TSE (most dominant exchange) to the Mexican BOLSA (least dominant 
exchange). The data match well with earlier arguments that Brazil is considered one of 
the more advanced emerging capital markets. 
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 Brockman and Chung (2003) show that lower quality investor protection induces higher liquidity costs in 
the form of wider bid-ask spreads. Therefore, the higher bid-ask spreads that I find for Mexico and Brazil 
versus the U.S. are exactly what we would expect assuming investor protection is less in emerging markets 




 Results also identify interesting patterns in cost and depth between the pre-crisis 
and crisis periods. Relative costs (HOME versus NYSE) fell, implying that the home 
markets became more competitive on cost during the crisis period. For example, median 
relative costs fell from 0.87 to 0.65, from 1.22 to 1.06, and from 1.74 to 1.49, for the 
Canadian, Brazilian, and Mexican listings, respectively. For the full sample, median costs 
fell 17% on the home exchange versus the NYSE during the crisis period. For the 
Canadian sample, all of the relative costs fell during the crisis period. For the Brazilian 
sample, relative cost fell for 11 of the 13 firms. For the Mexican sample, relative cost fell 
for 8 of the 10 firms. 
 Median market depths became more negative, implying that depths on the NYSE 
weakened relative to the home market during the crisis. For example, the median market 
depth difference changed from -0.0103 to -0.0278, from -0.0058 to -0.0205, and from 
0.0025 to -0.0406 for Canadian, Brazilian, and Mexican listings, respectively. For the full 
sample, median depth difference fell from -0.004 to -0.0267. Therefore, for a 1,000 share 
trade, prices changed 0.4% more on the NYSE versus the HOME markets during pre-
crisis period, but changed 2.67% more on the NYSE versus the HOME markets during 
the crisis period. For the Canadian sample, depth difference fell (TSE depth strengthened 
relative to the NYSE) for 17 of the 23 firms. For the Brazilian sample, depth difference 
fell for 11 of the 13 firms and for the Mexican sample, depth difference fell for 9 of the 
10 firms.   
 Interestingly, the changes in relative costs and market depth were not 




volumes remained fairly constant between the pre-crisis and crisis periods for each of the 
three HOME markets. 
 The declines in relative costs and depth differences were economically 
meaningful and pervasive, and point to clear structural shifts in market characteristics 
between the pre-crisis and crisis period. The decrease in relative costs for the HOME 
markets versus the NYSE and the decline in depth for the NYSE versus the HOME 
markets have similarly clear implications for a migration of price discovery from the 
NYSE to the HOME markets, which will be discussed in detail in the following section.    
 Results for the translation risk percentage indicate, relative to TSE prices, that 
New York prices bore the brunt of the burden to adjust to exchange rate shocks for most 
Canadian stocks. The median TRP equals 69% in the pre-crisis period and 75% in the 
crisis period. Results are less tilted toward a NYSE burden for the Mexican and Brazilian 
sample (median TRPs range from 44% to 62% for Brazil and Mexico over the two 
periods).  
 Figure 2.2 presents graphs of the paired coordinates for percent spreads, trading 
volume (monthly average, $USD in millions, using intraday trades), Kyle’s Lambdas, 
and TRPs for pre-crisis and crisis periods. Points below the 45 degree line indicate stocks 
for which the variable is larger on the NYSE versus the HOME market. The Figure 
shows that percent spreads grew for most stocks during the crisis period. Trading volume 
declined generally and became more clustered especially at the low end during the crisis 
period. Kyle’s Lambdas generally shifted below the 45 degree line, illustrating the 




during the crisis. TRPs also become more disperse, especially beneath the 45 degree line 
(greater NYSE burden to adjust to exchange rate shocks) during the crisis. 
  To quantify the degree of market dominance and to synthesize the multiple 
characteristic dimensions, I calculate a composite dominance score based on relative 
trading cost, relative trading volume, depth difference, and translation risk percentage. 
For each stock, for each month, binary scores are assigned to each of the four variables. 
The binary score for relative cost equals 1 if trading cost is less on the HOME market 
versus the NYSE. Identical procedures are followed for relative volume (score equals 1 if 
trading volume is higher on the HOME market), for market depth (score equals 1 if 
market depth is greater on the HOME market; i.e., if Kyle’s Lambda is smaller on the 
HOME market versus the NYSE), and for the translation risk percentage (score equals 1 
if the HOME market bears less of the burden to adjust to exchange rate shocks). For each 
stock, the binary scores are summed, ranging from a minimum of zero (complete NYSE 
dominance) to a maximum of four (complete HOME market dominance), and divided by 
4 to provide a dominance percentage. The table reports percentages averaged across 
stocks within each market. Panel A presents results for the pre-crisis period, and Panel B 
presents results for the crisis period. The final row in each panel reports the dominance 
score, Dom Score, which equals the average of the dominance percentages for the four 
variables, times 100. A score above 50 indicates that market characteristics favor the 
HOME market.  
 As illustrated in Table 2.5, the degree of dominance differs substantially across 
the three markets. Dominance scores for Canada equal 78.85 (76.32), indicating that 




NYSE during the pre-crisis (crisis) period. Dominance scores for Brazil show that 
approximately 56% (69%) of the market characteristics favored the BOVESPA relative 
to the NYSE during the pre-crisis (crisis) period. Dominance scores for Mexico show that 
approximately 36% (49%) of the market characteristics favored the BOLSA relative to 
the NYSE during the pre-crisis (crisis) period.  
 These results demonstrate a consistent ordering of market dominance (relative to 
the NYSE) for both periods from Canada to Brazil to Mexico. Most of the cross-country 
differences in dominance scores are statistically significant. For instance, t-statistics for 
differences in dominance scores during the pre-crisis period are: 4.34 between Canada 
and Brazil, 7.90 between Canada and Mexico, and 3.53 between Brazil and Mexico. And, 
t-statistics for differences in dominance scores during the crisis period are: 1.46 between 
Canada and Brazil, 4.59 between Canada and Mexico, and 3.13 between Brazil and 
Mexico. Interestingly, market dominance scores rose significantly for Brazil and Mexico 
during the crisis period, which correspond with declining NYSE information shares 
(Panel A of Table 2.4). The differences in market dominance across markets and time add 
to the robustness of the price discovery tests performed in this paper. Most studies are 
limited in this regard.  
 Of the control variables reported in Table 2.4 (Panels F - H), Canadian firms 
tended to be larger, with higher market-to-book values, and less recommendation 
dispersion versus Mexican and Brazilian firms. At the other end of the spectrum, 
Mexican firms tended to be smaller, with lower book-to-market values versus Canadian 




 These results highlight wide variation in the market characteristics for the three 
sampled markets versus the NYSE. Most importantly, the data show that the home 
market is not always the primary exchange. The data also indicate that cross-sectional 
variation in the variables is substantial across and within markets, all of which should 
lead to robust tests of the price discovery process. 
2.5.B.  Price Discovery Results 
2.5.B.i.  Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics for the NYSE information shares are presented in Panel A of Table 
2.4. The Panel shows that NYSE information shares are much lower for cross-listings 
from Canada than from Brazil or Mexico. For example, the median NYSE information 
share is less than 50% for Canadian cross-listings, but exceeds 50% for listings from 
Brazil and Mexico. The results support the market dominance proposition that price 
discovery migrates toward the market with the more advantageous trading venue.  
 NYSE information shares drop during the crisis period. During the pre-crisis 
(crisis) period, the median NYSE information share fell from 49% to 45% for Canadian 
stocks, from 74% to 57% for Brazilian stocks, and from 61% to 57% for Mexican stocks. 
Over the entire sample, the NYSE information share drops from 57.74% in the pre-crisis 
period to 50.01% in the crisis period, a difference that is statistically significant at the 
0.001 level (pairwise difference t-statistic equals 4.92). The NYSE information share 
drops for 71.74% of the firms (t-statistic for difference from 50% equals 3.27). These 
findings support a price discovery migration proposition in which price discovery 
migrates to the HOME market during crisis periods. The drops in NYSE information 




improvements in relative cost and market depth for the HOME market as discussed 
above. The improvements in cost and depth may have attracted more informed traders to 
the HOME market during the crisis period, which, in turn, may have led to increases in 
HOME information shares (alternatively, decreases in NYSE information shares). 
Assuming informed traders seek cheaper and deeper markets to minimize price impacts 
of their trades, then the drop in NYSE information shares during the crisis period is not 
surprising.  
2.5.B.ii.  Cross-Sectional Regression Price Discovery Results 
Tables 2.6 and 2.7 present results of cross-sectional regressions for the NYSE 
information shares for the period spanning all trading days May 1, 2008 – August 31, 
2008 (the “pre-crisis” period) and September 1, 2008 – December 31, 2008, (the “crisis” 
period), respectively. The dependent variable is the NYSE information share.  
 MV to BV + equals the market value of equity to book value of equity ratio for 
positive ratios only, otherwise MV to BV + equals zero. MV to BV dummy equals 1 if the 
market to book value ratio is negative. Recomm dispersion (3) is the standard deviation of 
U.S. analyst recommendations (coded 1 for strong sell to 5 for strong buy), when the 
number of analysts equals 3 or greater, otherwise recomm dispersion (3) equals zero. 
Recomm dispersion dummy equals 1 when the number of analysts is less than 3. 
Otherwise, Recomm dispersion dummy equals zero. Financial dummy equals one (zero) 
for all financial (non-financial) firms. For each of the two tables, results for simple linear 
regressions are presented in columns 1 through 8.  
 Results of the multiple linear regressions are reported in column 9 in each table. 




differences, I create an orthogonalized relative costs variable (resid relative costs) which 
equals the residual of the regression of relative cost against relative trading vol and depth 
difference. Similarly, resid trading vol is the residual of the regression of relative trading 
vol against relative cost and depth difference. t-statistics are reported in parenthesis below 
each parameter estimate. Panel corrected Huber/White standard errors are used to derive 
all t-statistics. For each variable (with the exception of the dummy variables), I will 
provide an interpretation of the magnitude of the estimated coefficients by, first, creating 
the baseline case in which all explanatory variables equal their respective sample 
medians. Then, I will increase each variable individually by 1 standard deviation of the 
observed values of the variable. A summary of these results is provided in Table 2.8. 
 As expected, NYSE information shares are higher for stocks with lower NYSE 
versus HOME trading costs and for stocks with greater NYSE versus HOME trading 
volume (e.g., slope coefficients on relative cost and relative trading vol are positive and 
statistically significant in all univariate regressions in Tables 2.6 and 2.7). These results 
agree with those of Eun and Sabherwal (2003b) in their study of Canadian cross-listings. 
As shown in Panel B of Table 2.8, percentage point changes in the NYSE information 
share associated with 1 standard deviation changes in relative cost equal 4.07 (2.96) for 
Canadian stocks, 3.17 (2.21) for Brazilian stocks, and 5.00 (4.50) for Mexican stocks, 
during the pre-crisis (crisis) period. Combining the sampled stocks, results show that a 1 
standard deviation increase in relative cost leads to an estimated change in NYSE 
information shares of  4.07 (3.37) percentage points during the pre-crisis (crisis) period. 
Similarly, for trading volume effects during the pre-crisis (crisis) period, a 1 standard 




increase in the NYSE information share. Results from the univariate regression (Panel A) 
are similar to those derived from the multivariate regression (Panel B).  
 My tests of depth differences show that the NYSE information is higher for cross-
listings in which the NYSE is the deeper market (coefficient on depth difference is 
positive). These findings are new to the literature and emphasize the importance of 
market depth effects for price discovery research. As illustrated in Panel B of Table 2.8, 
for the entire sample, a 1 standard deviation increase in depth difference is associated 
with a 3.87 percentage point increase in the NYSE information share in the pre-crisis 
period, and a 3.83 percentage point increases in the crisis period. These results show that 
the importance of market depth rivals that of trading cost as a determinant of price 
discovery, further illustrating the importance of including market depth in price discovery 
tests. Results from the univariate regressions (Panel A) are similar to the results from the 
multivariate regressions, indicating that the depth findings are not merely a statistical 
artifact of orthogonalization methods used in the multivariate regressions. These findings 
support the market depth proposition showing the market depth is an important 
determinant of price discovery, even after controlling for traditional venue characteristics 
such as trading volume and cost.  
 As expected the slope coefficient on TRP is negative and significant, implying 
that higher burdens of New York prices to adjust to exchange rate shocks are associated 
with lower NYSE information shares. Results also show that the slope coefficient 
increased markedly during the crisis period (e.g., from -0.17 to -0.26 in the multivariate 




leads to a 3.64 (6.91) percentage point decrease in the NYSE information share during 
the pre-crisis (crisis) period. 
 Of the four variables, the contribution of TRP rose the most during the crisis 
period. The dramatic rise in the importance of TRP is not surprising in light of the 
soaring volatility in exchange rates during the crisis period. From September 1 through 
the end of 2008, the U.S. dollar rose over 15% relative to the Canadian dollar, 32% 
relative to the Brazilian real, and 30% relative to the Mexican peso. Results reported in 
Table 2.8 show that the soaring exchange rate volatility was associated with a TRP effect 
on price discovery that was nearly double its pre-crisis effect. These findings support the 
exchange rate proposition showing that the burden to adjust to exchange rates is an 
important determinant of price discovery and offers incremental information beyond 
traditional trading volume and cost variables. 
 Results on the control variables (Tables 2.6 and 2.7) show that NYSE information 
shares are lower for bigger firms, but the relation is not significant in the multiple linear 
regressions suggesting that the firm size effect is subsumed by other variables in the 
regression. The sign of the size coefficient is counter to my priors that the HOME market 
has an information advantage for smaller firms, but is similar to the results reported by 
Eun and Sabherwal (2003b) in their study of Canadian cross-listings. At the very least, 
the inclusion of firm size ensures that the results for other variables in the multiple linear 
regression are not merely a manifestation of firm size effects. 
 Coefficients for mv to bv (+) are negative and significant in all regressions 
indicating, as predicted, that NYSE information share is lower for growth firms (higher 




significant in the pre-crisis period, and is insignificant in the crisis period. The pre-crisis 
results are counter to my priors that the HOME market possesses an information 
advantage for stocks characterized by greater information uncertainty.   
 The slope coefficient on the financial dummy is negative in all regressions, 
indicating that, as predicted, the NYSE information share is lower for firms that were the 
most affected by the deteriorating financial conditions of 2008. Based on the multiple 
linear regressions, NYSE information shares were approximately 6 (7) percentage points 
lower for financials versus non-financials during the pre-crisis (crisis) period, after 
controlling for other characteristics of the stocks. These results suggest there were no 
changes in the price discovery effects related to the financial sector for the pre-crisis 
versus crisis periods.  
2.6.  Summary and Conclusions  
This study makes five contributions. First, I examine intraday price and volume data for 
cross-listings onto the NYSE from Canada, Brazil, and Mexico, and find that market 
trading characteristics favor the home market only for Canada. In particular, percent bid-
ask spreads are lower and trading volumes are higher on the Toronto Stock Exchange 
versus the NYSE for Canadian stocks, indicating that the home market is the primary or 
dominant exchange. For Brazilian stocks, percent spreads are higher and trading volumes 
are higher on the BOVESPA versus the NYSE, indicating the home market dominates on 
volume, but not on cost. In contrast, for Mexican stocks, percent spreads are higher and 
trading volumes are lower on the BMV versus the NYSE, indicating that the home 
market is not the dominant exchange. I develop a dominance score based on relative cost, 




shocks, that shows that the differences in market dominance across the three countries are 
statistically significant and follow a distinct continuum from Canada (most dominant) to 
Mexico (least dominant). These findings are important because they show that market 
characteristics vary significantly across the data, adding to the robustness of the price 
discovery tests.  
 Second, using vector error correction models on 1-minute price and quote data for 
46 cross-listings for 2008, I find that the Canadian TSE is the price discovery leader, but 
that the Brazilian BOVESPA and Mexican BOLSA are not. Therefore, in contrast to 
existing studies, I find that the home market is not always the price discovery leader. I 
discuss how these findings are driven by differences in market dominance.  
 Third, I find that the trading characteristics strengthen in favor of the home 
markets during the crisis period September 2008 – December 2008. Trading costs fall on 
the home markets relative to the NYSE, market depth strengthens on the home market 
relative to the NYSE, and the burden of prices to adjust to exchange rates shocks lessens 
on the home market versus the NYSE. The rising dominance of the home markets during 
the crisis period also corresponds to a migration of price discovery from the NYSE to the 
home markets.  
 Fourth, I introduce two new variables to the price discovery literature: market 
depth and translation risk percentage. Market depth is important for price discovery 
because it measures the ability of the exchange to execute large orders with minimal 
impact on stock prices. Informed traders seek venues with minimal price impacts. 
Therefore, higher market depth should lead to higher price discovery. I argued that 




may fail to capture. The second new variable, translation risk percentage, measures the 
burden of prices on each exchange to adjust to exchange rate shocks. Most studies of 
price discovery ignore the information effects of exchange rates. I model exchange rates 
to play an independent role in the price discovery process. My tests are able to determine 
the extent to which price discovery is affected by exchange rate volatility.  
 Fifth, cross-sectional tests show that the price discovery on the NYSE is higher 
for cross-listings with greater NYSE market depth, lower burden to adjust to exchange 
rates on the NYSE, with greater trading volume and lower cost, and for smaller, low 
market-to-book firms. My tests show that the importance of market depth rivals that of 
trading volume and trading costs, which further illustrate the importance of controlling 
for market depth when examining price discovery. The burden of prices to adjust to 
exchange rates had the largest effect on price discovery of all four variables during the 









Canadian Cross-Listing Sample 
 
This table lists the 2008 TSE ticker symbol, company name, industry affiliation, NYSE cross-listing date, and total shares traded 
(in millions) for all of 2008 on the TSE and on the NYSE for each of the 27 Canadian cross-listings.  
 
2008 Ticker Name Industry Cross Listing Date 
BAM Brookfield Asset Management Inc  Financial 10/5/2005 
BMO Bank of Montreal Banking 1/2/1996 
BNS Bank of Nova Scotia Banking 1/2/1996 
BPO Brookfield Properties Real Estate 6/2/1999 
BVF Biovail Corporation International Pharmaceuticals 12/12/1996 
CLS Celestica Inc. Manufacturing 7/1/1998 
CM Canadian Imperial Bank Banking 1/2/1996 
CNQ Canadian Natural Resources Limited Oil and Gas 2/1/2003 
CP Canadian Pacific Railway Transportation 1/2/1996 
ENB Enbridge Oil and Gas 10/30/2001 
FFH Fairfax Financial Insurance 7/23/1996 
GAN Gainsco Insurance 7/31/1996 
GIL Gildan ActiveWear Apparel 6/10/1998 
MFC Manulife Financial Financial Services 3/9/1996 
NCX Nova Chemicals Chemicals 7/11/1998 
NT Northern Telecom Switching equipment 1/1/1996 
NXY Nexen Inc Oil and Gas 11/14/2000 
RBA Ritchie Brothers Auctioners Industrial Equipment 3/10/1998 
SLF Sun Life Financial Insurance 11/14/2002 
TD Toronto Dominion Bank Banking 8/30/1996 
THI Tim Hortons Inc Restaurant 3/22/2006 
TRP TransCanada Pipeline Oil and Gas 1/3/1996 








Brazilian ADR Sample 
 
This table lists the 2008 BOVESPA ticker symbol, company name, industry affiliation, NYSE cross-listing date, and ADR-to-share 
multiple for each of the 13 Brazilian ADRs.   
 
2008 NYSE 





BAK Braskem  Petrochemicals 8/31/2002 2 
CBD Companhia Brasil de Distribuição  Food 5/31/1997 2 
SBS Companhia de Saneamento Basico do Estado de Sao Paulo-SABESP  Utilities 5/10/2002 2 
CIG Comp Energetica de Minas Gerais Energy 8/16/1996 1 
ELP Compania  Paranaense de Energia Energy 7/30/1997 1 
CZZ Cosan Limited Sugar/Ethanol 8/14/2007 1 
CPL CPFL Energia Energy 1/2/1996 3 
ERJ Embraer-Empresa Brasileira de Aeronautica Aerospace 7/18/2000 4 
VCP Votorantim Celulose e Papel S.A. Paper 4/8/2000 1 
GFA Gafisa Construction 3/14/2007 2 
GOL GOL Linhas Aéreas Inteligentes  Airline 6/23/2004 1 
TAM TAM-Companhia de Investimentos em Transportes Airline 3/9/2006 1 










Mexican ADR Sample 
 
This table lists the 2008 BMV ticker symbol, company name, industry affiliation, NYSE cross-listing date, and 












AMX America Movil Telecomm 1/2/1996 20
ASR Grupo Aeroportuario del Sureste Industrials 2/26/2006 10
CX Cemex Building Materials 1/1/1996 10
FMX Fomento Economico Mexicano Beverage 5/9/1998 10
SIM Grupo Simec Mining and Metals 1/2/1996 3
HXM Desarrolladora Homex Housing 6/29/2004 6
IBA Industrias Bachoco Food 9/22/1997 12
ICA Empresas ICA Construction 1/2/1996 4
KOF Coca Cola Femsa Beverage 1/2/1996 10










This table presents percentiles for NYSE information share, relative trading volume, relative cost, market depth difference, translation risk percentage, 
firm size, market-to-book value, and analyst recommendation dispersion for 23 Canadian cross-listings, 13 Brazilian ADRs, and 10 Mexican ADRs for 




p5 p25 p50 p75 p95 p5 p25 p50 p75 p95
Canada 0.35 0.45 0.49 0.52 0.58 0.17 0.40 0.45 0.52 0.59
Brazil 0.58 0.67 0.74 0.79 0.89 0.27 0.46 0.57 0.70 0.91
Mexico 0.33 0.55 0.61 0.70 0.77 0.14 0.36 0.57 0.73 0.86
Full Sample 0.36 0.48 0.56 0.70 0.85 0.18 0.40 0.50 0.61 0.85
p5 p25 p50 p75 p95 p5 p25 p50 p75 p95
Canada 0.48 0.59 0.87 0.99 1.90 0.39 0.45 0.65 0.81 1.35
Brazil 0.73 0.92 1.22 1.55 8.30 0.56 0.77 1.06 1.37 1.61
Mexico 0.90 1.38 1.74 1.97 3.15 0.60 1.08 1.49 1.84 2.77
Full Sample 0.49 0.78 1.00 1.50 2.75 0.41 0.57 0.83 1.23 2.31
p5 p25 p50 p75 p95 p5 p25 p50 p75 p95
Canada 0.07 0.13 0.28 0.41 0.85 0.06 0.15 0.27 0.37 0.74
Brazil 0.20 0.30 0.39 0.48 0.89 0.20 0.27 0.39 0.48 0.64
Mexico 0.15 0.47 0.52 0.65 0.97 0.11 0.45 0.55 0.63 0.91
Full Sample 0.07 0.24 0.38 0.50 0.87 0.08 0.23 0.36 0.50 0.80
p5 p25 p50 p75 p95 p5 p25 p50 p75 p95
Canada -0.0771 -0.0245 -0.0103 -0.0001 0.0084 -0.0956 -0.0423 -0.0278 0.0002 0.0081
Brazil -0.0470 -0.0168 -0.0058 -0.0038 0.0499 -0.1162 -0.0426 -0.0205 -0.0140 -0.0118
Mexico -0.0272 0.0005 0.0025 0.0487 0.3152 -0.1891 -0.0540 -0.0406 -0.0043 0.0290
Full Sample -0.0470 -0.0168 -0.0040 0.0006 0.0499 -0.1082 -0.0536 -0.0267 -0.0071 0.0101
Panel D. Depth Difference
Pre-Crisis Crisis
Pre-Crisis Crisis
Panel B. Relative Cost
Pre-Crisis Crisis
Pre-Crisis
Panel A. NYSE Information Share
Crisis







Table 2.4, continued 
  
p5 p25 p50 p75 p95 p5 p25 p50 p75 p95
Canada 0.07 0.35 0.69 0.85 0.90 0.12 0.33 0.75 0.90 0.96
Brazil 0.25 0.39 0.44 0.47 0.66 0.10 0.22 0.51 0.61 0.79
Mexico 0.29 0.46 0.62 0.72 0.89 0.24 0.41 0.57 0.76 0.87
Full Sample 0.24 0.39 0.52 0.72 0.89 0.12 0.35 0.60 0.80 0.91
p5 p25 p50 p75 p95 p5 p25 p50 p75 p95
Canada 1,058            4,834            20,397          59,586          496,428       894               4,663            20,481          55,972          422,915       
Brazil 2,566            5,269            7,978            11,717          17,039         2,395            5,014            8,004            11,605          19,787         
Mexico 1,623            2,339            4,185            16,717          51,929         1,400            2,195            2,804            15,363          49,269         
Full Sample 1,623            3,658            9,041            26,845          365,900       1,400            2,804            8,264            20,962          346,622       
p5 p25 p50 p75 p95 p5 p25 p50 p75 p95
Canada 0.94 1.69 2.35 3.16 5.83 0.52 1.19 1.57 2.36 5.31
Brazil 0.86 1.13 1.75 2.34 3.85 0.54 0.89 1.38 1.81 3.37
Mexico 0.65 1.02 1.64 2.37 6.90 0.45 0.64 0.88 1.66 5.51
Full Sample 0.88 1.38 1.96 2.94 5.83 0.51 0.87 1.43 1.95 5.16
p5 p25 p50 p75 p95 p5 p25 p50 p75 p95
Canada 0.58 0.67 0.76 0.88 1.13 0.58 0.67 0.76 0.88 1.13
Brazil 0.52 0.58 0.83 1.00 1.50 0.52 0.58 0.83 1.00 1.50
Mexico 0.52 0.76 0.82 1.01 1.13 0.52 0.76 0.82 1.01 1.13
Full Sample 0.52 0.67 0.78 0.96 1.17 0.52 0.67 0.78 0.96 1.17
Panel F. Size (US $000)
Pre-Crisis Crisis
Panel G. Market-to-Book Value
Pre-Crisis Crisis
Panel E. Translation Risk Percentage










Market Characteristics Percentage Dominance 
 
This table reports market dominance percentages for relative cost, relative trading volume, depth difference, and translation 
risk percentage. See Table 4 for definitions of the variables. For each stock, for each month, binary scores are assigned to each 
of the four variables. The relative cost binary score equals 1 if, relative to the NYSE, trading cost is less on the HOME market. 
Identical procedures are followed for relative volume (score equals 1 if trading volume is higher on the HOME market), for 
market depth (score equals 1 if market depth is greater on the HOME market), and for the translation risk percentage (score 
equals 1 if the HOME market bears less of the burden to adjust to exchange rate shocks). For each stock, for each month, the 
binary scores are summed, ranging from a minimum of zero (complete NYSE dominance) to a maximum of four (complete 
HOME market dominance), and divided by 4 to provide a dominance percentage. The table reports percentages averaged 
across months and stocks within each market for the Pre Crisis period (Panel A), and then repeated for the Crisis period (Panel 
B). The final column in each panel reports the dominance score, Dom Score, which equals the average of the dominance 
percentages for the four variables, times 100. t-tests are performed for the null hypothesis that Dom Score equals 50%. The t-





  significant at the 0.05 level 
*
 significant at the 0.10 level 
Rel Cost Rel Vol Depth          TRP Dom Score Rel Cost Rel Vol Depth          TRP Dom Score t -stat
Canada 0.8590 0.8718 0.7692 0.6538 78.85** 0.9079 0.8947 0.6316 0.6184 76.32** -0.55    
Brazil 0.3137 0.7843 0.9216 0.2353 56.37   0.4400 0.8000 0.9600 0.5600 69.00**  2.28**









Cross-Sectional Price Discovery Tests, Pre-Crisis Period 
 
This table presents results of cross-sectional regressions for the price discovery for the period spanning all trading days May 1, 2008 – August 31, 2008. 
The dependent variable is the NYSE price discovery information share, derived using the Hasbrouck (1995) method. t-statistics are reported in 




significant at the 0.001 level 
** 
significant at the 0.05 level 
* 








Cross-Sectional Price Discovery Tests, Crisis Period 
 
This table presents results of cross-sectional regressions for the price discovery for the period spanning all trading days September 1, 2008 – December 
31, 2008. All variables are defined in Table 6. t-statistics are reported in parenthesis below each parameter estimate. Panel corrected Huber/White 




significant at the 0.001 level 
** 
significant at the 0.05 level 
* 
significant at the 0.10 level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




relative trading vol 0.3842***
(7.25)
ln(size) -0.0355*** -0.0116 -0.0116
(-6.33) (-1.47) (-1.47)
mv to bv(+) -0.0281*** -0.0222** -0.0222**
(-2.86) (-2.10) (-2.10)
mv to bv dummy 0.0845 -0.1263** -0.1263**
(1.21) (-2.49) (-2.49)
recomm dispersion(3) 0.0418 -0.0203 -0.0203
(0.52) (-0.23) (-0.23)
recomm dispersion dummy 0.1889 0.0734 0.0734
(1.48) (0.88) (0.88)
depth difference 0.8423*** 0.9137***
(6.32) (4.38)
TRP -0.3401*** -0.2609*** -0.2609***
(-13.83) (-6.00) (-6.00)
resid relative cost 0.0478 0.1058
(0.79) (2.05)
resid relative vol 0.166 0.324
(0.92) (1.98)
resid depth difference 1.1261***
(4.38)
constant 0.5233*** 0.4039*** 0.3527*** 0.8287*** 0.5415*** 0.4569*** 0.5280*** 0.6936*** 0.8514*** 0.8225***
(12.79) (10.44) (15.01) (9.76) (11.21) (9.97) (14.39) (17.5) (6.41) (6.27)








Relative Contributions of Each Variable to Price Discovery 
 
This table reports impacts on the NYSE information share of each of the main variables of interest: relative cost, 
relative trading volume, depth difference, and translation risk percentage. Definitions of the variables are provided in 
Table 4. Each entry equals the effect on the NYSE information share of a one standard deviation increase in the 
variable in question. For each variable, the entries equal the multiple linear cross-sectional regression slope multiplied 
by 1 standard deviation (calculated across all stocks within the same country). Panel A presents results from the 
univariate regression. Panel B presents results from the multivariate regression. Results for the full sample are reported 
in the final row of each panel. 
 
Rel Cost Rel Vol DepthDiff TRP Rel Cost Rel Vol DepthDiff TRP
Canada 0.0163 0.0609 0.0083 -0.0777 0.0282 0.0780 0.0183 -0.0916
Brazil 0.0148 0.0322 0.0052 -0.0258 0.0293 0.0412 0.0113 -0.0305
Mexico 0.0304 0.0636 0.0419 -0.0533 0.0602 0.0815 0.0918 -0.0629
Sample 0.0272 0.0622 0.0243 -0.0635 0.0495 0.0797 0.0531 -0.0749
Rel Cost Rel Vol DepthDiff TRP Rel Cost Rel Vol DepthDiff TRP
Canada 0.0407 0.0711 0.0133 -0.0445 0.0296 0.0609 0.0323 -0.0793
Brazil 0.0317 0.0397 0.0083 -0.0148 0.0221 0.0353 0.0281 -0.0569
Mexico 0.0500 0.0505 0.0669 -0.0305 0.0450 0.0558 0.0557 -0.0546





Panel A. Univariate Results




   
Figure 2.1 




Figure 2.1 shows the weekly Volatility (VIX) Index over the period 1/1/2008 














































Figure 2.2 show pairwise coordinates are graphed for percent bid-ask spreads, trading 
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APPENDIX A: GREAT RECESSION TIMELINE 
 
CHRONOLOGY OF SEPTEMBER 2008 – DECEMBER 2008 KEY FINANCIAL EVENTS 
 
September:  On September 7, government sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac were placed in government conservatorship by the Federal 
Housing Finance Agency. On September 15, Lehman Brothers filed for 
bankruptcy sending shockwaves through the global financial community. 
At the same time, reeling Merrill Lynch was sold to Bank of America and 
the Fed injected enormous amounts of cash into the banking system 
including $85 billion alone to AIG. The S&P500 fell nearly 5% on 
September 15 and the VIX soared an unprecedented 24%, making it the 
worst stock market day in seven years. On September 25, facilitated by the 
FDIC, J. P. Morgan acquired failed Washington Mutual Savings and Loan, 
which was the largest bank failure in U.S. history.  
 
October: On October 3, Wells Fargo announced plans to acquire failing Wachovia 
Corporation. California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger alerts Treasury 
Secretary Timothy Geithner that the liquidity crisis threatened to shut 
down the state of California, which he claimed needed a $7 billion 
emergency loan from the federal government. Also on October 3, 
Congress passed the largest financial bailout in history totaling $700 




billion of the $700 (Troubled Asset Relief Program) billion bailout money 
to dodge disaster in the automobile industry. The S&P500 dropped nearly 
10% over the 2-day period October 6 and 7 after the Fed announced it 
would make up to $900 billion available to U.S. banks through its Term 
Auction lending facility.  
 
December: It was discovered that Bernie Madoff of Madoff Investment Securities ran 
a $50 billion Ponzi scheme, devastating many institutions and high-net 
worth individuals who had invested with his firm. 
 
 
 
